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ABSTRACT 
This paper is an examination of the issue of whether the judiciary of New Zealand 
should be armed with a power to review legislation, that is contrary to fundamental 
human rights. It is not suggested that any of the previous or future governments 
will attempt to sweep away our basic rights. The problem, is one of Parliament 
having far too much power, thus enabling them to enact small erosions of our 
rights. This results from the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, and the 
absence of constitutional checks in the system. It is argued that the judiciary 
already have a limited indirect power to review legislation, through the methods of 
interpretation employed. These interpretation methods have gained a statutory basis 
under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, and the significance of this will be 
discussed. 
The major impediment to establishing a direct right for reviewing legislation, is the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. This is analysed in the New Zealand 
constitutional setting and the conclusion of this paper is that parliamentary 
sovereignty is not as absolute as it once was. This is illustrated through a 
comparison with other jurisdictions, and the factors which have caused such a 
changed perception. The judiciary are the logical choice to act as guardians of 
fundamental rights, and this is illustrated through a discussion identifying the 
reasons in favour and against this proposition. As an entrenched Bill of Right has 
presently been vetoed in New Zealand, and there is no written constitution, the only 
alternative to make up for the absence of constitutional safeguards i to allow a 
common law right. The statements made by Sir Robin Cooke, commonly known 
as the "fundamentals" doctrine, may provide authority for this for when the need 
arises in New Zealand. 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes , bibliography and 
annexures) comprises approximately 16,000 words. 
1 
Modern Anglo-American Constitutional theory is pre-occupied with one central 
problem. The problem consists in devising means for the protection and 
enhancement of individual human rights in a manner consistent with the democratic 
basis of our institutions. 1 
I INTRODUCTION 
Recent times have seen a call for the establishment of fundamental human rights. 
In many countries the response has been the incorporation of a Bill of Rights as 
part of the written constitution. In New Zealand there is no written constitution, as 
such, although the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 19902 was enacted to protect 
individual human rights. This is only an ordinary statute, and the result of this is 
that the New Zealand judiciary have not been given a statutory power to review 
legislation that is inconsistent with fundamental human rights. 
There are standard judicial techniques used to interpret legislation so that it is 
consistent with the values of society, and Part II will examine these techniques. It 
is submitted that this is an indirect method for upholding legislation so it is 
consistent with our fundamental rights. However, it is a limited tool as Parliament 
can still expressly override such rights , and interpretations have to be within 
realistic limits. The Bill of Rights has given a statutory basis for taking these 
values into account, and Part III will discuss the Bill of Rights, and its significance 
for the judiciary in interpreting legislation. 
It would be more logical for the judiciary to be able to directly review legislation. 
The biggest impediment in granting the judiciary this power, is parliamentary 
sovereignty, and a purpose of this paper is to examine whether this principle is still 
sound in the absolute sense. To determine this, Part IV will examine the 
constitutional situation in New Zealand , in which Parliament is said to be 
sovereign. Dicey postulated the "sovereignty of Parliament" doctrine many years 
ago, and the only limitation is the inability to bind future Parliaments. This 
sovereignty gives Parliament unlimited powers to make law. A much used example 
is that in "theory" Parliament could pass a law requiring that all blue-eyed babies be 
killed, or a law could be passed abolishing the monarchy. 
2 
TRS Allen "Legi slative Supremacy and the Rule of Law : Democracy and 
Con titutionalism" ( 1985) 44 CLJ 111. 
Hereinafter referred to as the "Bill of Rights." 
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However, several writers have suggested that parliamentary overeignty is not as 
absolute as one might believe. Part V will examine the extent of parliamentary 
sovereignty in other jurisdictions, and Part VI will discuss the suggestion that there 
is a changing perception regarding Parliament's unlimited law-making powers in 
New Zealand. 
If it is accepted that Parliament is not absolutely sovereign, it is important to ask if 
the judiciary are able to undertake this function. Part VII will discuss the reasons 
for and against the judiciary being guardians of our fundamental rights. If we 
accept these then the only possible alternative in New Zealand i to allow the 
judiciary to have a common law power. 
Support may already be established for this power through the Fundamentals 
doctrine, postulated by Sir Robin Cooke in several obiter dicta statements between 
1979 and 1986. His Honour commented that: "some common law rights 
presumably lie so deep that even Parliament could not override them."3 The cases 
were supported by an extra-judicial statement, supporting the idea of the judiciary 
as guardian of these so called fundamental rights.4 Part VIII will analyse this 
alleged common law power. 
Part IX will conclude as to whether parliamentary sovereignty is an impediment to 
the judiciary in being able to review legislation, and will make some suggestions 
for protecting fundamental rights in New Zealand in the future. 
II ST AND ARD JUDICIAL TECHNIQUES FOR 
INTERPRETING LEGISLATION 
Under the separation of powers doctrine, Parliament is said to legislate and the 
courts' role is to interpret and apply this legislation. It is well accepted that the 
courts' apply a "purposive" approach in interpreting provision , which means the 
words are read in their fullest context, to ensure that the purpose of the legislation is 
achieved. 5 There are several techniques used by the judiciary to depart from the 
ordinary meaning of the words in a statute, so as to avoid unacceptable result . 
3 
4 
5 
Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board [ 1984) I NZLR 394,398 
R Cooke "Fundamentals" [ 1988] NZLJ I 58, 165. 
This is reflected in s 5(j) Acts Interpretation Act 1924. 
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These include: strained interpretations; substitution of words; the reading in of 
words or qualifications; and ignoring words.6 
As regards legislation that impinges on fundamental rights, the courts can and will 
give a strained interpretation to minimi e any infringements. The judges strive to 
ensure that an interpretation is given that upholds certain accepted values of our 
legal system. The interpretation of provisions is affected by values external to the 
statute, that create "presumptions" of interpretation, and could be termed a judicially 
created Bill of Rights. They do not stand still, and can adapt with changing times, 
and new ones can come into existence. This can be shown by the increased 
attention given to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi and the law of Maori 
rights and interests.? 
This method of interpretation is rationalised by arguing that these factors are guides 
to establishing parliamentary intent. The argument is that Parliament would not 
have intended to legislate in contradiction to these rights, hence an interpretation 
that is consistent with them is given. However, sometime these factors cut 
directly across the parliamentary purpose.8 
These values have been held to include: liberty, freedom of property, the right to a 
fair hearing and access to the courts, the presumption against retrospectivity, and 
privacy, to name just a few. Some recent cases illustrate these values being 
incorporated into the interpretation of legislation.9 The liberty of the subject is a 
strong value, and legislation has been construed narrowly so this value is infringed 
as little as possible. Thus, if a penalty is extraordinarily harsh, the judges tend to 
find loopholes in the legislation to avoid convictions. IO Furthermore, limitations 
have been placed on provisions allowing the police to search and obtain information 
from arrested persons. 11 In Perkins v Police 12 it was stated: 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
For a discussion of this and examples see J F Burrows Statute Law in New Zealand 
(Butterworths, Wellington, 1992) 150-158. 
In Hua/.:.ina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority l 1987] 2 NZLR 188, a 
statute which made no direct reference to treaty or Maori issues was read to require such a 
reference. 
Above n 6, 159. 
These examples are taken from above n 6, 160-164. 
See R v Munks [ 19641 I QB 304. 
Sec Moulton v Police [ 1980] I NZLR 443; Perkins v Police [ 1988] I NZLR 257. 
Above n 11. 261. 
The police must be ever conscious of the limits upon their statutory powers and the courts 
must preserve the balance which was the aim of the legislation so that personal freedom, 
privacy and dignity are not infringed beyond the extent prescribed in the greater public 
interest. 
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Another value is the right to a fair hearing, and the rules of natural justice have not 
been found to be easily excluded by a statute determining administrative tribunal 
procedures. 13 Furthermore, "privative clauses" that attempt to disallow tribunal 
decisions to be reviewed by a court, have received very narrow constructions. 14 
Privacy has often been an important factor in construing a statute, and protection of 
this value has resulted in strict constructions. For example, in Acts conferring 
official powers of search and questioning. 15 
Another presumption is that Parliament does not intend to legislate contrary to 
principles and obligations of international law. This allows scope for construing 
provisions so they are in accord with international fundamental rights of which 
there is a developing jurisprudence, even though the legislation is not enacted to 
directly give effect to these rights and obligations. 16 
These values have lead to: artificial constructions of the text in an Act; 17 narrow 
constructions of general words; 18 reading in of implied qualifications to absolute 
statutory provisions; 19 and the upholding of common law rules alongside an Act. 20 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
See We/gas Holdings Ltd v Commerce Commission [ 1990] I NZLR 484. 
See New Zealand Waterside Workers' Federation Industrial Association of Workers v 
Frazer [ 1924] NZLR 689; New Zealand Engineering Union v Court of Arbitration [ 1976) 
2 NZLR 283. 
See Moulton, above n 11; R v Doe ( 1985) I CRNZ 506; R v La Hood [ 1989] 3 
NZLR 616; New Zealand Stock Exchange v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1990] 2 
NZLR 120. 
Sec Police v Hicks [1974] I ZLR 763,766; Van Gorkom vAttorney-General [1977) 
I NZLR 535 , 542-543; Department of Labour v Latailakepa [ 1982] I ZLR 632, 635-
636; Commissioner of Inland Revenue v JFP Energy Incorporated ( 1990) 12 NZTC 
7176, 7179. 
For example in Frazer, above n 14. 
For example in Moulro11, above n 11 . 
For example in Ex Pa rte Connor [ I 981] QB 758. 
For example in Perkins, above n 11. 
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The courts are attempting to give effect to the parliamentary purpose as well as 
protecting the citizen from excesses of power. As Gallen J said, a judge to some 
extent stands between Parliament and the citizen and has obligations to both.21 
Keir and Lawson stated:22 
The judges seem to have in their minds an ideal constitution, comprising those fundamental 
rules of common law which seem essential to the liberties of the subject and the proper 
Government of the country .. . they do not override the statute, but are treated, as it were, as 
implied terms of the statute. 
It has been stated that judges are "finishers, refiners and polishers" of legislation,23 
and they exercise "quality control" over it.24 Thus, "context" includes giving effect 
to the values underlying the statute and the values of wider society. It is submitted 
that interpreting statutes so as to give effect to wider values of society, is similar to 
reviewing legislation which contradicts these values. It is just an indirect way of 
doing so. However, there is a limitation as provisions can only be legitimately 
interpreted to accord, as far as possible, with these values, and the interpretation 
must be realistic. Parliament can still enact legislation expressly overriding these 
rights. 
The Bill of Rights contains an express provision that statutes will, where possible, 
be interpreted consistently with the rights contained in the Bill. This is recognition 
in statutory form of the influence of values in interpretation of provisions. Many of 
the rights are similar to the judge-made Bill of Rights used prior to the enactment of 
this statute. 
21 
22 
23 
24 
See New Zealand Law Commission Legislation and its Interpretation - Preliminary Paper 
No 8 (Wellington, 1988) 146. This consideration gave the Law Commission reason to 
consider whether a modernised version of s S(j) Acts Interpretation Act 1924 ought to 
make express reference to these values. See ew Zealand Law Commission A New 
Interpretation Act - Report No J 7 (Wellington, 1990) 24-31. 
D L Keir & F H Lawson Cases in Constitutional law (Sed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1967)11. 
Corcoraft Ltd v Pan American Airways Inc l 1969] l QB 616, 658. 
G Morris et al Laying Down the Law (2ed, Butterworths, Sydney, 1988) 103 . 
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III New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
The Bill of Rights Act is significant in four respects. Firstly, the interpretation of 
the sections is a further illustration of how the judiciary can lessen the effect of 
impinging legislation by interpreting it to be consistent with the rights upheld in the 
Bill of Rights. Secondly, it represents an attempt to create a statutory power for 
the judiciary to review legislation. Thirdly, it will operate as a constraining 
influence on proposed legislation put before Parliament. Finally it will provide 
grounds for the opposition and the public to criticise both proposed and existing 
legislation. 25 
A Background 
The Bill of Rights was enacted in July 1990. This was the result of a White Paper 
introduced in 1985 by Geoffery Palmer, the policy being that the New Zealand 
system of government was in need of improvement, given the small Parliament and 
the absence of a second house. It was intended to have a dual role. Firstly, new 
limits would be placed on the powers of government, and secondly it was to play 
an educative role for the public, so they can measure government's performance 
against set standards. An awareness of our basic rights, coupled with a desire to 
uphold them, is an essential weapon in our armoury against a powerful 
government. 
The proposed Bill was to be entrenched, to make it supreme law.26 The reasons 
given in the White Paper for such a measure included: the extensive powers of 
Parliament and government combined with the limited controls on the e powers;27 
the danger of erosion of our rights, albeit small erosions over time; the growing and 
very extensive role of the state; implementation of New Zealand's international 
25 
26 
27 
B V Harris "The Constitutional Base" in H Gold (ed) New Zealand Politics in Perspective 
(3ed, Longman Paul Ltd, Auckland, 1992) 56, 72-73. 
This would mean it could not be repealed or altered by an ordinary Act passed by a simple 
majority. This would require 75 % of the Members of Parliament or a majority at an 
electors referendum. 
The power of government are large, and a general election is a blunt instrument which 
cannot give judgement on particular issues. See A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A 
White Paper [ 1985] AJHR Vol I A.6, 27 para 4.7. 
7 
obligations;28 the danger in waiting for the flood before we build the dam; and 
because of the examples of other countries. 
The White Paper acknowledged that no Parliament we are likely to have in the 
future is going to attempt to sweep away basic rights. For example, it is quite 
absurd to state that Parliament will contemplate an Act declaring all blue eyed babies 
must be murdered. The problem lies in the continual danger of the executive 
making small erosions of these rights. Each step makes the next one easier. The 
need of implementing an array of policies has given way to personal rights and 
freedoms. 29 
This measure would have instituted a radical constitutional change in allowing 
judicial review of legislation, and an increased political role for the senior members 
of the judiciary. It would have been a direct attack on parliamentary sovereignty. 
This role was to be granted to the judiciary in recognition of the fact that: 30 
The role of the courts in modern society is a changing role ... It is for the judiciary to 
ensure that the powers of the executive and the legislature are contained within their 
respective spheres and that the rights of the citizen are not overborne by the powers of the 
state. 
The purpose is to establish a legal safeguard to be administered in conjunction with 
the existing safeguards. It was believed that there was a "political market" for such 
a document. 31 However, it was seen as essential that there be a public consensu 
before such a measure was introduced. That consensus wa not to happen. Four 
hundred and thirty-one submissions were received, and the proposal that there be 
judicial review of Acts of Parliament was unacceptable to many people.32 
Some caveats need to be made to this statement. Firstly, on a reading of the 
submissions it seems that many of the people opposed to entrenchment, were 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Such as our ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 
1972. 
Above n 27, 27 para 4.8-4.10. 
Sir Ronald Davison "The Role of the Courts in Modern Society" ( 1979) 4 OLR 277. 
G Palmer New Zealand's Constitlllion in Crisis (John Mclndoe Ltd , Dunedin , 1992) 52-
53. 
For the arguments for and against an entrenched Bill of Rights see Appendix I. 
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adamantly opposed to a Bill of Rights at all. Seemingly only one third of the total 
submissions mentioned the "power given to the judiciary" as a reason for opposing 
the proposal. One submission stated that: "the power should not be shifted from 
'Parliamentarians elected to Judiciary appointed' thus depriving John Citizen of his 
democratic voting right which can change a government every three years."33 Such 
a statement can be analysed in light of the conclusion of the National Council of 
Women who observed that:34 
A small but not insubstantial number of replies were of doubtful value because of evident 
ignorance of how the New Zealand system of government works beyond the legislature. 
This was particularly, but not exclusively, in relationship to the proposed function of the 
courts; many seem unaware of the whole field of administrative law. We consider that 
before effective consent can be given to the Bill of Rights, steps must be taken to educate 
the electorate on the processes of government. 
Another illustration was the New Zealand Law Society's oppo ition to the Bill of 
Rights. Given that a poll of its members revealed that only 6 per cent believed they 
had a comprehensive understanding of the Bill, this leads one to believe that an 
important reason influencing opposition was a lack of understanding of our system. 
If lawyers had not familiarised themselves with such an important document, one 
does wonder about the extent of the knowledge of others who forwarded 
submissions. 
Because of this opposition the Justice and Law Reform Committee,35 
recommended that the Bill of Rights only be enacted as an ordinary statute. 
Moreover they commented that the community as a whole has a limited knowledge 
of fundamental human rights issues and the protection they deserve, and a limited 
understanding of the role for the judiciary. The policy behind the resulting ordinary 
statute is that it will (and does) provide some necessary checks and balances, and it 
performs an educative function. This is obviously something that the public of 
New Zealand will only benefit from. 
33 
34 
35 
Submissions on a Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper [ 19851 vol 4, 339W. 
Interim Report of the Justice and Law Reform Committee 011 the Inquiry into the White 
Paper - A Bill of Rights for New Zealand [ 1986 J AJHR vol X 1.8A, 22. 
Final Report of the Justice and Law Reform Committee on a White Paper: A Bill of 
Riglzt.1· for New Zealand [ 19881 AJHR vol XVII I .8C. 
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Parliamentary sovereignty is enshrined in the Act, as section 4 means that 
inconsistent legislation must nevertheless prevail thereby preventing the judiciary 
from having a power to review legislation. In the future there may be support for 
an amendment to the Act to give it status as an entrenched document, although this 
will depend on how the judiciary has acted, and are perceived to have acted, under 
the present Bill of Rights. 
B Practical Effects 
The more important question to ask is what practical effect has the Bill of Rights 
had. To some, the heart of the Bill of Rights was destroyed when it was deprived 
of constitutional status as superior law. They forecasted that it would not have any 
practical effect. It is fair to say that they have been proven wrong. The manner in 
which the judiciary have interpreted this piece of legislation shows that it will be 
important. As Palmer states,36 it sends a message to government that certain kinds 
of Jaws hould not be enacted. 
The combined effect of a purposive approach37 giving full effect to the spirit of the 
contained rights, a principle of effectiveness that entails giving full measure to 
human rights guarantees, and the recognition of the relevance of international 
materials in this area,38 has given another tool to the judiciary to review legislation 
in an indirect manner. This therfore gives them a powerful role as a protector of 
human rights, notwithstanding that the constitutional document they are interpreting 
is not superior law, and upholds parliamentary sovereignty. 
1 Interaction of Sections 4, 5 and 6. 
The operational provisions contained within the Bill of Rights are sections 4, 5 and 
6. An analysis of these sections and appropriate cases will illustrate the extent of 
36 
37 
38 
Above n 31, 58. 
Palmer v Superintendent of Auckland Maximum Security Prison [ 1991 J 3 NZLR 315, 
321, per Wylie J. The Court of Appeal took the first opportunity to confirm such an 
approach in Flickinge r v Crown Colony of Hong Kon g [ I 99 I J I NZLR 439, 440. 
Subsequent cases have all confirmed thi s generous interpretation which will involve a 
broad inquiry examining the values underlying the rights . 
A Shaw and A Butler "The New Zealand Bill of Rights Comes Alive (I)" [ 1991] NZLJ 
400. 
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the practical power encapsulated. Firstly, it is necessary to set out the three 
prov1s1ons. 
4. Other enactments not affected - No court shall, in relation to any enactment 
(whether passed or made before or after the commencement of the Bill of Rights),-
(a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked, or to 
be in any way invalid or ineffective; or 
(b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment -
by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of this Bill of 
Rights. 
5. Justified Limitations - Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and 
freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society . 
6. Interpretation consistent with Bill of Rights to be preferred - Wherever 
an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and freedoms 
contained in this Bi II of Rights , that meaning shall be preferred to any other meaning. 
It is submitted that there are two techniques the judiciary have adopted in applying 
these sections to statutes to give themselves maximum powers. Firstly, the 
approach taken to sections 4, 5 and 6 that allows section 4 to be considered only in 
limited situations. Secondly, the adoption of interpretations that fit with the Bill of 
Rights, even if this means going against the previous interpretation of a section or 
statute. The problem with the judiciary determining such issues as applicability of a 
Bill of Rights, or whether a statute infringes a fundamental human right, is 
inevitably the diversity of approaches favoured by different personalities in the 
judiciary. The case law under the Bill of Rights is by no means an exception. 
The most important ea es on how to interpret the interaction between sections 4, 5 
and 6 are Ministry of Transport v Noort; Police v Curran , 39 two cases involving 
the right to a lawyer in breath and blood alcohol investigations. The lower court 
applied section 4 meaning that sections 58A, 58B and 58C of the Transport Act 
1952 were determined to be inconsistent with the Bill of Rights, and they were to 
prevail. In the Court of Appeal there was unanimity as to the result, although the 
five judges were split three ways as to the reasoning, as they foresaw differences in 
39 [1990-1992] I ZBORR97. 
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the role of section 5.40 This is understandable given the difficult wording of the 
sections, which states that section 5 "is subject to section 4." 
Cooke P held that section 5 is only concerned with limits on rights, and was 
irrelevant when the court is dealing with a statute as section 4 prevails.41 His 
Honour used his own assessment to limit the right and as there was no 
inconsistency between the Transport Act 1952 and the limited rights it was not 
necessary to apply section 4, 5 or 6. This analysis has been described as a "rather 
original approach." It affords section 4 more authority than it ought to have, while 
giving an extremely limited and primarily negative role to section 5.42 
Gault J also believed section 5 was irrelevant for issues concerning statutes, but his 
reasoning was that it is not the courts' function to determine whether a limitation is 
reasonable or not.43 Therefore a right or freedom will be read down under section 
6 so it can be given effect to, consistently with the other enactment. For these two 
judges the courts' role is fixed by sections 4 and 6. Although, both acknowledge 
that it would not be permissible to invoke section 4 without first exhau ting the 
possibility of reconciling the statutes under section 6. With respect, these does 
seem something inherently wrong with an approach that requires that section 5, the 
Bill of Rights' own statement on the reasonableness criteria, be ignored in favour of 
a judge's personal assessment as to the limits.44 
The majority did assign a role to section 5 in analysing an infringement provided for 
by a statute. Richardson J (McKay J concurring) treated section 5 as an abridging 
provision. The first inquiry is whether there is a justified limitation prescribed by 
law. Thereafter section 6 will only apply if the limitations imposed are 
unreasonable in terms of section 5, and section 4 will only apply if the enactment 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
The result was that suspects should be told of a right to telephone a lawyer. Although 
Gault J, the dissenting judge, would have dismissed the case as they had not established 
that they were not told of a right to a lawyer. However, in obiter dicta he appears to agree 
with the other judges. 
Above n 39, 143- 145. Although it is relevant in common law issues, and when the 
Attorney General is performing his function under s 7. 
See J Elkind "On the Limited applicability of Section 4, Bill of Rights Act" [ I 993) NZLJ 
111, 114. 
Above n 39, 176-177. 
See P Rishworth & S Optician "Two Comments on Ministry of Transport v Noort " 
[ 1992] NZRLR 189, 196. 
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and the right cannot be read consistently, even following the modification of the 
right.45 In other words section 4 only falls for consideration when following the 
application of sections 5 and 6 there is a necessary inconsistency between the Bill of 
Rights and the other enactment. The approach of Hardie Boys J is similar, 
although he employs section 6 first in order to ascertain whether the enactment and 
the rights in their entirety can be read consistently. If this is impossible, section 5 is 
used to read down the right, so it can be read consistently. Failing this, section 4 
must prevail. 
The consensus among the commentators is that the majority judges articulated the 
correct approach.46 Some of the other cases have followed a imilar approach, by 
emphasising section 6 instead of section 4. This type of technique that focuses on 
section 6 is a method that has been and can be used to limit the effect of legislation 
so that it reflects consistently with our fundamental human rights. 
However, not all the judiciary have followed this approach, and some have been 
much quicker to find a section of another piece of legislation as inconsistent with 
the Bill of Rights.47 Alternatively section 4 has been applied, instead of first 
considering sections 5 and 6.48 A further approach has been to recognise that 
section 4 only excludes a right or freedom where "on no reasonable interpretation of 
45 
46 
47 
48 
Above n 39, 158-159. The advantage of this approach is that it gives full effect to s 5, 
allowing it to be used for the purpose for which it was intended. 
See B Forbes 'The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Does it have Force or Effect" 
Unpublished, Legal Writing Requirment, VUW, 1992, 13; P Rishworth and S Optician 
above n 44, 195; J Elkind above n 42, I I I; F M Brookfield "Constitutional Law" 
[ 1992) NZRLR 231, 237-240. 
For example in R v Waddel [ 1992) BCL 139, Thomas J held that s 18(2) and (3) of the 
Misuse of Drug Act 1975 prevailed overs 23( I )(b) of the Bill of Rights. On analysis 
there is nothing in s 23(1 )(b) of the Bill of Rights which impliedly repeals or revokes ss 
18(2) or (3) of the Misuse of Drug Act 1975, and therefore the better approach would 
have been to apply ss 5 and 6 and find a limitation ons 18. 
For example in New Zealand Underwater Association Incorporation v The Auckland 
Regional Council [ 1992) BCL 237, the Planning Tribunal held that the long title of the 
Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 prevailed overs 20 of the Bill of Rights . Another 
example is R v Hoy Unreported , 6 December 1991 , Court of Appeal, CA 315/91, 7 
where an argument was advanced that s 23(4) of the Bill of Rights allowed the defendant 
to refrain from making any tatement to the collector of customs, and to be informed of 
that right. Hardie Boys J cited s 4 and stated "[t]hat section is a complete answer to 
counsel's submissions." 
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the other enactment could there be any room for the right or freedom in any form, 
qualified or otherwise."49 If the right passes this test (whether qualified or not) 
then section 6 comes into play, and a consistent interpretation with the Bill of 
Rights is applied. Then, section 5 is used to strike a balance between the objectives 
underlying the rights and freedoms with the objectives of the other enactments.SO 
It is submitted that if sections 4, 5 and 6 are applied as Richardson J proposed, the 
potential of the Bill of Rights is very strong. If sections 5 and 6 are applied as they 
ought to be, then the application of section 4 will hardly ever arise. 51 Elkind 
believes that section 4 should only arise on occasions in which the Bill of Rights is 
clearly inconsistent with earlier legislation. With respect, this misses the point. 
The combination of sections 4, 5 and 6 means there is nothing stopping Parliament 
from passing inconsistent legislation. It can be argued that Parliament would not 
have intended to enact an inconsistent meaning, but this argument only works !fa 
consistent interpretation can be found. 
2 Section 6 
The importance of section 6 is recognised by Rishworth, who comments:52 
In Noort, for example, Gallen J commenced hi s analysis with ss 4 and 5. Section 6 i 
mentioned only in passing, and in a part of the judgment which comes after his conclusion 
has been reached. In Curran, Doogue J quoted section 6 but noted that no submissions 
were made upon it by counsel; his judgment focuses ons 4 and mentions s 5 only to say 
that its " relevance ... for the case ... is not immediately apparent." 
This is where the task of the judiciary becomes important, because if they cannot 
find a consistent meaning with the Bill of Rights, then the inconsistent legislation 
49 
50 
This was developed in Herewini v Ministry of Transport [1993] 2 ZLR 747, 765 where 
Fisher J followed Hardie Boys J in Noort and al o built on the view of Ri shworth in 
"Applying the New Zealand Bill of Ri ghts Act I 990 to Statutes: The Ri ght to a Lawyer 
in Breath and Blood Alcohol Cases" [1991] NZRLR 337, and Rishworth above n 44. 
Section 6 is the "bridging" section instead of s 5. Brookfield submits that in the end it is 
doubtful whether the result would be any different. See FM Brookfield "Constitutional 
Law" [ 1993] NZRLR 278, 288-290. 
5 I Above n 42, I I I. 
52 See Ri shworth, above n 49, 339. 
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overrides. The important question is how far the judiciary are willing to strain an 
interpretation to find it consistent. As discussed above, "reading down" general 
words is a time-honoured construction technique, particularly when the statute 
concerned is impinging on individual rights or freedoms.53 Much will depend on 
the statutory context, the "value" of the right in issue and judicial willingness to 
uphold the Bill of Rights.54 
Section 6 is not triggered by ambiguity alone. It extends to any enactment that is 
capable of being interpreted in more than one way. Burrows55 suggests a number 
of ways in which a court can interpret statutory provisions to render them consistent 
with the Bill of Rights. These techniques include: giving a consistent meaning 
where the words of an enactment are ambiguous; reading down general language in 
statutes;56 giving a liberal and extensive interpretation to provisions so as to comply 
with the Bill of Rights; where enactments use open-ended expressions like 
"reasonable," using the Bill of Rights to prescribe the content of reasonableness; the 
"reading in" of qualifications on statutory powers may sometimes by required; and 
reading words in a secondary sense, rather than in their primary sense. 
An analysis of the cases will show just how the courts have played their role. In 
the first Bill of Rights case to be heard, Flickinger v Crown Colony of Hong 
Kong 57 section 66 of the Judicature Act 1908 was discussed in relation to an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus. For 90 years this section had been 
interpreted so that it did not confer a right of appeal in a criminal matter. Moreover 
the interpretation Flickinger put forward had been specifically rejected in earlier 
cases. 58 The court adopted this changed interpretation based on section 6 of the 
Bill of Rights. Although this was obiter in that the court found nothing had 
occurred on the facts, contrary to the Bill of Rights, it is a radical step to take. 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
Above n 6, 339. 
P A Joseph Constitutional and Administratil'e Law in New Zealand (Law Book Co Ltd , 
Sydney, 1993) 867. 
Above n 6, 339-341. 
In recognition that the various rights in the Bill of Rights have been declared fundamental 
by Parliament, and therefore ought to be treated as such. 
[1991] I NZLR 439 . 
R v Clarke [ 1985) 2 NZLR 2 I 2, had confirmed the long standing rule, that an appeal did 
not lie under which is now s 66 of the Judicature Act 1908, in a criminal matter. 
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Support for this change can be found in other cases that have adopted the same 
approach regarding section 66.59 
R v Phillips 60 points against such an approach. Although it was possible to 
construe section 6(6) Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 consistent with the right contained 
in section 25 of the Bill of Rights, even if only just, it was held that the clear but 
(arguably) infringing meaning was to be adopted. 61 Otherwise a strained and 
unnatural interpretation would be adopted, which the court i not justified in giving. 
There have been many cases in which section 6 has been applied. 62 However, 
there have also been cases that have applied section 4, in recognition that the courts 
have no power to declare enactments invalid.63 The differences highlight the 
variety of approaches being taken by the judiciary members. It is submitted that if 
the courts use this tool properly it will become very important. This entails firstly 
testing a provision against the criteria in section 5,64 and then, if it is found there is 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
O'Connor v R Unreported , 16 November 1990, Court of Appeal, CA 305/90, "assumed 
without deciding" that the Bill of Rights had that effect, and Callaghan v Superintendent 
Mt Eden Prison [1992) I NZLR541 left the point open. 
[ 199 I] 3 NZLR 175. 
Rishworth argues that if the court had applied s 5, they could have concluded that s 6(6) 
was not inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. The reverse onus for a burden of proof 
where a person has to prove they are not suppliers of drugs, operates only after a certain 
minimum weight of drugs has been found in their possession . This may be reasonable 
under the Oakes test (a Canadian test ons 5 which the courts have expressed a preference 
for) . See P Rishworth "Applying the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: The First 
Fifteen Months" in Essays on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Legal Research 
Foundation, Auckland, 1992) 24. 
For example in R v Rangi [ 1992) I NZLR 385, the section was neutral on the question 
of who should prove "reasonable excuse." It was held that the Bill of Rights required the 
burden to be placed on the prosecution. Re M [ I 992) I NZLR 29 held that "pub! ic 
interest" for the purposes of the detention sections of the Mental Health Act I 969, should 
be interpreted in light of the Bill of Rights. 
For example Salisbury v McA loon Unreported, 7 January I 99 I, High Court, Nelson 
Registry , CP 62/90, where it was held that the Bill of Rights did not justify the court 
ignoring or rewriting in some way the detailed procedure provided for by the Summary 
Proceeding Act 1957. See also Re S [1992) I NZLR 363. 
This is important as otherwise the rights may be seen as absolute, and then it will be 
much easier to find statutes that are inconsistent with the right contained in the Bill of 
Rights . 
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still an infringement, an interpretation consistent with the Bill of Rights can be 
looked for. Failing this, section 4 will apply.65 
3 Section 7 
The other significant feature of the Bill of Rights, is that it also provides a restraint 
on the law-making powers of Parliament through section 7, which states: 
7. Attorney-General to report to Parliament where Bill appears to be 
inconsistent with Bill of Rights - Where any Bill is introduced into the House of 
Representatives, the Attorney-General shall, -
(a) In the case of a Government Bill , on the introduction of that bill, or 
(b) In any other case, as soon as practicable after the introduction of the Bill, -
bring to the attention of the House of Representatives any provision in the Bill 
that appears to be inconsistent with any of the rights and freedoms contained in 
this Bill of Rights. 
If this section was used so that legislation which infringed fundamental human 
rights would never be passed, this would be a strong argument for not giving the 
judiciary a power to review legislation. However, it does not work this way. 
Although it is a formal disincentive against Parliament legislating in derogation of 
the Bill of Rights, Parliament can still pass legislation that infringes these rights. 
Although it will have to be done with conscious knowledge that it will be brought to 
the attention of the public and the opposition. 
There has been a debate whether the reporting function under section 7 shall take 
account of the limiting effect of section 5. Unfortunately this is another issue in 
which the Court of Appeal in Noort were split on. A majority of the commentators 
support Richardson J's approach which means that the reporting obligation only 
arises when there is a prima facie infringement which is not a reasonable and 
65 The same analysis can be applied to situations where a statute confers discretionary power 
in a form showing Parliament intended rights to be infringed. The question for the court 
is whether it is a necessary inference from the statute that Parliament intended the 
discretion to be used in this way. See Rishworth, above n 61 , 27-28. 
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justified limit under section 5.66 Otherwise the House will be deluged with section 
7 reports, accompanied by explanations of section 5 excuses. 
In practise the Attorney-General has adopted this approach. There is value in 
elevating a section 7 report so that Parliament views it as a strong disincentive to 
enact legislation that will require such action. Ultimately somebody has to 
determine what is and is not a justifiable limitation, and the present procedure gives 
responsibility to Departments who have the expertise to be able to independently 
adjudicate upon limitations on ab olute rights. 
An interim procedure was put in place by the Attorney-General for scrutinising all 
legislation.67 In brief, Bills are scrutinised by the Department of Justice, unless the 
Bill is being promoted by them and then it is referred to the Crown Law Office. 
Initially all draft legislation is forwarded to the Department of Justice before it is 
presented to the Cabinet Legislation Committee, and after it is so presented. Hence, 
some redrafting occurs at this stage of the process. Bills are then introduced into 
the House and if an inconsistency is detected by an examining officer, this shall be 
reported to the Attorney-General and Parliamentary Counsel, with a draft report for 
the Attorney-General to present to the House. 68 
Some examples of legislation in which a section 7 report has played a part in 
changing legalisation, illustrate the practical effect of this provision. Firstly, in late 
1990 the Minister of Justice was determining the form for legislation bringing in 
66 
67 
68 
See Burrow , above n 6, 871-872; J McGrath "The Bill of Rights and the Legislative 
Process" in The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Legal Research Foundation , 
Auckland, 1992) I 02-103 ; Rishworth "How does the Bill of Rights Act Work" [ 1992] 
ZRLR 189, 198. Although Fitzgerald in "Section 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990: A Very Practical power or a Well-Intentioned Nonsense" (1992) 22 VUWLR 
136-169, favours the approach of Cooke P, which allows s 7 reports without reference to 
s 5, as it is preferable for the legislature to apply s 5 in the public arena, with an 
opportunity for public input. 
Memorandum "Monitoring Bills for Compliance with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990" from Attorney-General to all Ministers and Chief Executive, 9 April 1991 . This 
has not been amended and continues to apply: Personal Correspondence to Writer, Paul 
Ea t Attorney-General, 15 August 1994. 
This is the procedure for government Bills. Non-government Bills are scrutinised by the 
Department of Justice immediately following introduction and then the same procedure is 
followed to relay the results to the Attorney-General. 
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new restrictions on the grant of bail. The proposal was for the courts to refuse bail 
to any person charged with a "specified offence" (certain violent crimes) who has 
two or more previous convictions for such an offence. This, it was argued, 
contravened section 24(b) of the Bill of Rights because of the substantial restriction 
and the curtailment of the courts' discretion. If the provision had been introduced, 
a section 7 report would definitely have been required. The Minister of Justice was 
not prepared to introduce this knowing that a report would be given, and therefore 
the provision (now section 318 Crimes Act 1961) was amended to be consistent 
with the Bill of Rights. 
The Transport Safety Bill, now the Transport Amendment Act (No 3) 1992, which 
permits random breath testing of motorists, was the first case where the Attorney-
General gave a section 7 report concerning government sponsored legislation. The 
report concluded that clause 17 was inconsistent with sections 21 and 22 of the Bill 
of Rights. The reasoning being that the evidence was inconclusive in establishing a 
clear link between stopping motorists and the underlying road safety objective. 
Hence, it is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights, and is not saved by section 5. 
The House of Representatives passed this Bill despite the report, due to several 
opinions that the random testing provision did not contravene the Bill of Rights. 69 
There has been a debate on whether this provi ion does violate the Bill of Rights. 
Elkind 70 supports the Attorney-General's report and Rishworth71 does not, 
because he believes that the legislative goal was manifestly important while the 
intrusion of individual liberty was relatively slight, and that Parliament is entitled to 
believe that random breath testing will reduce deaths.72 
It is beyond the extent of this paper to enter into the debate of the merits of this Act. 
The point is simply illustrative of the fact that as Parliament is the ultimate judge, 
they can still enact legislation which has been given a section 7 report. Although it 
has been argued that the legislation:73 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
See J Elkind "Random Breath Testing, the Bill of Rights and the International Covenant" 
[1993) NZRLR 335,337. 
Above n 69, 335 . 
P Rish worth "Random Breath Testing : A Brief Response" [ 1993) NZRLR 341 . 
Above n 71 , 342. 
Above n 54, 874. 
-
Must m,sume a high level of political significance before most Ministers would entertain 
promoting legali ation in the face of the Attorney-General's report. The Minister would 
want to weigh carefully the merits of the legislation against any political cost in defending 
it. 
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There have been two other government measures that have attracted a section 7 
report. Firstly, the Films, Videos and Publications Classification Bill, contained a 
clause that made it an offence for any person to possess an "objectionable" 
publication. This, the report stated was inconsistent with section 26( 1) of the Bill 
of Rights, which states that no one shall be liable for an offence, if it was not an 
offence at the time it occurred. This measure was enacted anyway. Secondly, the 
Children Young Persons & Their Families Amendment Bill, contained a provision 
on "mandatory reporting" of child abuse, and the report held this was inconsistent 
with section 14 of the Bill of Rights, which provides for the freedom of expression. 
Although this reporting requirement has been removed from the legislation, the 
main reason for this is the inability of the system to cope, rather than because of the 
section 7 report.74 
Parliament is the ultimate judge as a section 7 report can and has been ignored. 
There may be political costs involved in ignoring such a report, but how much will 
these compensate for the injustice afforded to people? The Attorney-General points 
out that there is a need for sufficient time to vet a draft bill, as issues need to be 
identified and addressed at the earliest opportunity.75 
Another weakenss in the section 7 process is the absence of post-introduction 
scrutiny procedures. Section 7, as it stands, applies to what is done at the time the 
Bill is introduced. This may bear little relation to the Bill in its final form. McGrath 
states: "It would be a matter of concern if a practice emerged whereby changes to 
74 Information from Personal Correspondence, above n 67. There has also been two reports 
by the Attorney-General in relation to non-governmental mea ures, that have caused parts 
of legislation to be withdrawn. In the Napier City Council (Control of Skateboards) 
Empowering Bill the Select Committee recommended the Bill should not proceed for 
reasons including non-compliance with s 23 of the Bill of Rights. In the Kumeru District 
Agricultural and Horticultural Society Bill the Select Committee omitted a clause once 
the Attorney-General pointed out that it infringed s 27(a) of the Bill of Right . 
75 Information from Personal Correspondence, above n 67. 
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the Bill 0f Rights Act protections were to be made at stages sub equent to 
introduction."76 
Other weaknesses include the possibility that human rights issues will be missed 
completely, or the absence of a section 7 report will remove any misgivings about 
the po sibility of an infringement.77 In defence of the process, Burrows argues 
that Paul East's stand on the Transport Safety Bill may establish a constitutional 
convention for future Attorney-Generals, through his unqualified acceptance of the 
duty to report on Bills.78 
C Conclusion 
The courts have embraced "the spirit" of the Bill of Rights and its powers. A recent 
Court of Appeal case has highlighted that the judiciary regards the Bill of Rights as 
an important document that they can use.79 Our ordinary statute Bill of Rights is 
another mechanism for applying the techniques of "interpreting legislation." The 
problem of using this indirect technique is that there are limitations. Firstly, the 
diversity of approaches in applying the operational provisions means that section 4 
can come into play too quickly. Secondly, section 6 interpretations must not be 
strained. Thirdly, section 7 reports may be a significant restraint, but they can by 
overridden. In the end Parliament can still enact legislation inconsistent with 
fundamental rights. 
The Bill of Rights is a positive step in erecting formal barriers to Parliament's law-
making powers, in that it has made it more difficult for the rights contained to be 
displaced by the "ordinary legislative process." However, parliamentary 
sovereignty still reign supreme. The Bill of Rights is clearly a beneficial 
constitutional reform, but the question is whether it goes far enough. 
76 
77 
78 
79 
See McGrath above n 66, I 04. 
See Fitzgerald above n 66, 143. 
Above n 6, 873-874. 
For the first time compensation was awarded for a breach of a rights. The absence of a 
remedies provision was not an impediment to the courts ability to "develop the 
possibilities of judicial remedy." See Baigent v Attorney-General Unreported, Court of 
Appeal, CA 207/ 93. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL 
To examine the wider question of whether a direct power should be implemented, 
the New Zealand constitutional situation needs to be examined, because the most 
forceful impediment to an enactment of a direct power for reviewing legislation, is 
parliamentary sovereignty. It is only once we examine this doctrine, that we can 
determine further questions of why we need an ability to review legislation, and 
whether the judiciary should be the ultimate check on Parliament. 
A The Constitution Act 1986 
In New Zealand we have no single comprehensive written document that contains 
the ground rules by which government is conducted. The closest we have is the 
Constitution Act 1986, which preserves the es ence of Westminster Government 
and provides a basic guide to the composition and powers of the in titution .80 
However, it is a fragmented document as much of the detail is found elsewhere. 
Furthermore, it is not superior law, as it is an ordinary statute. 81 At face value the 
Act gives no formal limitations on the laws Parliament can make. Section 15(1) 
provides: "Power of Parliament to make Laws - (1) The Parliament of New 
Zealand continues to have full power to make laws." 
There are no guarantees regarding fundamental rights and liberties, so laws that are 
repressive and unjust can be passed by Parliament. Sir Geoffery Palmer believes 
that the only checks are political. He states that: "Parliament could pass a law 
requiring all blue-eyed babie to be murdered. It has not done so. It would be 
wrong to do so. But in theory it can do so." 82 
Harris has described the New Zealand Constitution as having four special 
characteristics.83 Firstly it has "missing element "in that there is no comprehensive 
written constitution, no entrenched Bill of Rights and no second legislative 
chamber. Secondly, the Constitution can easily be altered by Parliament. Thirdly, 
it is of a relatively unsystematic nature as there are a variety of sources, many 
80 
81 
82 
83 
See G Palmer Unbridled Power (2ed , Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1987) 3. 
See above n 31, 29 . 
Above n 31 , 50. 
B V Harris "The Constitutional Basis" in H Gold (ed), above n 25, 75-76. 
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aspects are inherited from Britain, and it was developed in an unplanned and 
spontaneous manner. Lastly, there is a difference between the constitutional 
position in law and the operation in reality. The consequence is that the 
Constitution is not easily understood. 
B Parliamentary Sovereignty 
I History 
The development of the modern view of sovereignty began with Hobbes, who 
stated that a sovereign's powers are indivisible.84 Professor Dicey took this idea of 
absolute sovereignty and located it in Parliament. Thereafter, English constitutional 
theory received into New Zealand holds that Parliament is sovereign and can 
legislate on any topic, because there are no fundamental laws under parliamentary 
sovereignty. The justification behind parliamentary sovereignty is that the people 
elected Parliament, therefore its supremacy means, in effect, the overeignty of the 
people.85 There is only one limitation on Parliament's legal power; it cannot bind 
its successors. 
The flipside of this is that the judiciary have to obey and apply what the legislature 
enact. Theoretically the doctrine of sovereignty is a common law principle. It 
derives from obiter dicta of judges and writings of jurists. This means it is a 
common law rule. There are some commentators who di agree with this tatement, 
for example Winterton argues that the assertion that "[p]arliamentary sovereignty is 
a result of the law declared by the courts" is simply historically inaccurate. 86 He 
argues that parliamentary sovereignty was established in fact by Parliament, after a 
long truggJe, and not by the courts. 
84 
85 
86 
T Hobbes "Leviathan: or, the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth , 
Ecclesiastical and Civil" (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1957) 213. 
See G Winterton 'The British Grundnorm: Parliamentary Supremacy Re-examined" 
( 1976) 92 LQR 590, 596. 
G Winterton "Parliamentary Supremacy and the Judiciary" ( 1981) 92 LQR 265, 273 . 
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There arc a number of commentators who support the principle being a common 
law doctrine. 87 This does not mean it is an ordinary rule of common law, it is in a 
class of its own as it is the ultimate political fact upon which the whole system of 
legislation hang . 88 Every legal system has to have certain ultimate principles upon 
which all others are derived.89 
2 Legal basis of New Zealand sovereignty 
New Zealand operates under a single set of government institutions, so there is no 
sharing of sovereignty, as with countries that have a federal division. A unitary 
state like New Zealand, which has no entrenched laws and no entrenched Bill of 
Rights is the perfect example of legislative supremacy. 90 Section 15 of the 
Constitution Act 1986 means an enactment by Parliament is the highest source of 
law. There is nothing preventing the passing of a law that is totally repugnant to 
fundamental human rights, and all the courts are permitted to do is apply this latest 
expression of the will of Parliament. 
3 Do we need limitations? 
Sir Owen Woodhouse postulates that the sanction against such abuse of power 
does not lie with the courts, but with public opinion. He states: "The true sanction 
which ensures continuation [of the supremacy of law] is public opinion."91 This is 
true given the dominance of the government and the absence of other safeguards. 
However, is this enough? Ultimately the Government can be voted out, but surely 
this comes too late.92 For example, if Parliament passes an Act which defies 
87 For example, Sir Owen Dixon "The Common Law as an Ultimate Constitutional 
Foundation" [ 1957] 31 ALJ 240; HWR Wade "The Basis of Legal Sovereignty" [ 1955] 
CLJ 172; TRS Allan "The Limits of Parliamentary Sovereignty" [ 1985] PL 612. 
88 See Wade, above n 87, 187-188. 
89 See Dixon, above n 87, 242. 
90 In other countries the norm is to have a written constitution embodied in a formal 
document and protected as a kind of fundamental law against amendment by simple 
majority in the legislature. 
9l O Woodhouse Government Under the Law (NZ Council for Civil Liberties, Price 
Milburn and Co Ltd, Wellington, 1979) 11 . 
92 Furthermore, the strength of this check is dependent on the ability of the electoral system 
to translate the will of the people. See M Chen "Remedying New Zealand's Constitution 
in Crisis: Is MMP Part of the Answer?" ( 1993) NZLJ 22, 23. 
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fundame11tal human rights, by the time the responsible Government is voted out, 
the rights have already been violated. Furthermore, with absolute powers 
Parliament can radically amend electoral laws, which may prevent them being voted 
out.93 Should we not have a protection that stop this law operating before any 
breach is made? Many argue that this simply raises an academic argument. The 
mere possibility that Parliament might attempt to overrule fundamental rights doe 
not mean they will do it. 
There are two counter arguments to this. Firstly, powers are not lost by defining 
them. 94 By stating that Parliament cannot pass these Jaws does not result in 
Parliament being powerless; it merely lays down the ultimate limits. Parliament in 
New Zealand only consists of a single chamber, which means checks that other 
countries have are lacking. Furthermore, reality shows Parliament is under 
pressure in passing legislation and frequently is limited in its time to examine the 
background reasons for the legislation. An English Queen's Counsel summed up 
the danger in this way:95 
During some future period of social tension the sacrifice by Parliament to populism might 
be the freedom of speech of an unpopular political group ; perhaps an increase in violent 
crimes might stimulate widespread support for the removal of res traints in police powers, 
or a relaxation of the procedural guarantees for the fair trial of the accused, or more 
primitive punishment for the convicted. 
In reality some kind of constitutional check is needed as our constitutional 
arrangements mean that the executive has a large share of the power, at the expense 
of Parliament.96 
Secondly , an analogy can be made with fire insurance: "The protection is not 
normally needed, when it is the need arises very suddenly."97 The mere presence 
of safeguards to which people can appeal in a future time of crisis, would act as a 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
Above n 9 I , I I. 
Above n 91, I I. 
A statement made by A Lester, discussed in O Woodhou e Government Under the Law, 
above n 91, 15 . 
This may not be so true under MMP. See discussion below part VI B . 
A comment by Sir Owen Woodhouse, discussed in PA Joseph & GR Walker "A Theory 
of Constitutional Change" ( 1987) 7 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 155, 165 . 
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sensible limitation upon the executive. Perhaps one of the most fundamental 
principles in our con titutional system is now in question, in that we require some 
degree of separation of function that cannot Parliament cannot upset. New 
Zealand has been the classic reactive state by uncritical adherence to parliamentary 
sovereignty. Perhaps it is time we put some limitations in place. 
C Attacks on Dicey 
As one commentator describes it, we are: "brainwashed ... in [our] professional 
infancy ... by the dogma of legislative supremacy."98 Walker99 states that although 
there have been obiter dicta that support Dicey's theory of absolute sovereignty, 
there have been no decisions that have upheld this doctrine in a case where the 
statute in question made a clear attack on a fundamental constitutional principle. 
Moreover, there have been some notable decisions in conflict with the doctrine. 
Dicey did not demonstrate that Parliament was omnipotent, he just stated it was. In 
fact, Walker describes Dicey's theory as: "like some huge, ugly Victorian 
monument that dominates the legal and constitutional landscape and exerts a 
hypnotic effect on legal perception." 100 
In defence of Dicey, he did recognise that there are restraints on Parliament 
implementing such a law, namely convention, morality, and good faith. However, 
this misses the point. We should also have a legal restraint as a backstop for 
denying the enforceability of legislation that overrides human rights, if Parliament 
chooses to ignore all these other constraints. 
There has been something of a controversy concerning the Grundnorm behind the 
Dicey an hypothesis. Professors Allot 101 and Marshall1 °2 have both criticised 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
HWR Wade Constitutional Fundamentals (Stevens, London, 1980) 68. 
G Walker "Dicey's Dubious Dogma of Parliamentary Sovereignty : A Recent Fray with 
Freedom of Religion ( 1985) 59 ALJ 276, 276-277. 
Above n 99, 283. 
His views about Dicey's theory is that they "fly in the face of 1000 years of talk about 
fundamental law by Kings, judges, political men and commentators" See P Allot "The 
Courts and Parliament: Who Whom?" (1979) 38 CLJ 79, 114. 
He argued that the position established for Parliament in the seventeenth century was one 
merely of supremacy relative to that of other organs of government, not of legislative 
omnipotence as such. This is supported by cases such as Bonham's Case 8 Co Rep 
113b;77ER646,andR vL01•e (1651)5 tTr43, 172. 
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Dicey's theory, and even Blackstone 103 was not willing to state that parliamentary 
sovereignty was the same as omnipotence. Some believe that sovereignty has 
become a serious ob tacle to constitutional development and that it was never 
clearly and formally or democratically made part of the constitution. 104 
There are both theoretical and practical objections to absolute sovereignty. I05 The 
practical objections are the feeling of abhorrence which people have to the notion 
that the legislature, even if democratically elected, can enact monstrous legislation 
that is still lawful. Theoretically the doctrine of sovereignty is a common Jaw 
principle, so arguably it is itself subject to common law elaboration. As Rishworth 
notes, this idea developed by the judges that Parliament may pass any law it likes, 
was not referring to laws that are fundamentally unjust. 106 If Parliament cannot 
abolish itself or control its successors, why stop at these limitations? 
There are two issues to address here. Firstly, is it possible for parliamentary 
sovereignty to be subject to common law elaboration? Judicial obedience to 
statues, as stated above, is not based on the authority of statute. It reflects a judicial 
choice based on an understanding of what political morality demands. Thi so 
called "grundnorm" lies in the ambit of the judiciary. A Salmond tated, it is 
always for the courts in the last resort, to say what is a valid Act of Parliament, and 
this is not determined by a rule of law made by authority outside the courts, it i a 
political fact. 107 
The boundaries of sovereignty should be determined con idering the prevailing 
moral and political values we accept as fundamental. The doctrine of sovereignty is 
grounded in the community's political morality, and this is based on "representative 
democracy," because this is most likely to secure certain fundamental standards of 
civilised government. Therefore if a Parliament enacts a statute, which undermine 
the democratic basis of our institutions, it cannot be said that it derives validity from 
103 
104 
105 
Discussed in above n 99, 278. 
Above n 99, 284. 
See Builders ' Labourers Federation v Minister Industrial Relations ( 1986) 7 NSWLR 
372, 402. 
l06 P Rishworth "Civil Liberties" in H Gold (ed), above n 25, 143 at 149 
107 See Wade, above n 87, 189. 
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the enacLment process. Political morality would direct the judiciary towards 
resistance rather than obedience. 108 
Some examples will illustrate. If, Parliament enacted legislation abolishing the 
monarchy or establishing one-party government, or a dictatorship, this would 
attack the fundamentals of democracy, and it is submitted that it cannot be valid. If 
Parliament tried to enforce it, the courts could theoretically strike it down, as it 
would derive no authority from the doctrine of sovereignty. Similarly the same 
process of reasoning would apply to legislation requiring that all blue-eyed babies 
be killed, or that all religious minorities be suppressed. 
The second issue to consider is whether it should be Parliament who undertakes 
any elaboration of the doctrine. Can the rule of common law that states the courts 
will enforce statutes itself be altered by a statute? 109 Salmond answers this question 
by stating: 1 IO 
But whence comes the rule that Acts of Parliament have the force of law? This is legally 
ultimate ... it is the law because it is the law, and for no other reason that it is possible for 
the law itself to take notice of. No statute can confer this power upon Parliament for this 
would be to assume and act on the very power that is to be conferred. 
The rule is above and beyond the reach of statute, for the very reason that it is itself 
the source of the authority of statute. 
A question posed by Wade, is whether there must be a legal break with the past 
(such as a revolution) before the traditional doctrine of sovereignty can be 
changed. 111 Dispelling with a constitutional fundamental could very well in itself 
create a revolution. It is preferable to have a change in doctrine undertaken by the 
judiciary, that i available to prevent this from happening. Therefore there is, at 
least in theory, authority for the judiciary to review infringing legislation. This is 
based on the origins of parliamentary sovereignty. 
108 
109 
II 0 
111 
See Allan, above n 87, 622 -623. 
See Wade, above n 87, I 86. 
G Williams Jurisprudence (IOed, Sweet & Maxwell , London, 1947) 155. 
Above n 98, 44. 
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V THE EXTENT OF PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY 
IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
The defiance against absolute sovereignty of Parliament is illustrated by the 
jurisdictions that have empowered the judiciary to determine human rights issues. 
This i done through the supremacy of the Constitution, which is tantamount to a 
restriction on sovereignty for the benefit of the individual. There has been a move 
away from Parliament having complete and absolute law making powers 
concerning human rights. A primary function of the judiciary in any country that 
has a proper Constitution, in which no one organ has unlimited power and there is 
legal machinery to prevent violation, is to adjudicate on the constitutionality of 
Acts. 112 
A United States 
The United States is a constitutional democracy, as their written constitution is 
supreme law. It is well settled that the courts have an inherent authority to strike 
down statutes that transcend the limits imposed by the federal and state 
Constitution. 113 The very purpose of the Constitution is to prevent experimentation 
with fundamental rights. The first 10 amendments to the Federal Constitution are, 
in themselves, a Bill of Rights that aims to protect citizens against infringement. 114 
The judiciary have considered issues that, in New Zealand would be con idered 
political and could only be resolved by Parliament. Consequently, the United 
States Supreme Court has been called the "world's first human rights tribunal" 
because of the crucial role played by them in determining the agenda of human 
rights. 115 
112 
113 
114 
115 
Above n 98, 98. 
American Jurisprudence 2d (2ed, Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co, New York, 1979) 
vol 16 S 150. 
These rights include: freedom of religion, speech and assembly; freedom to keep and bear 
arms; freedom from unreasonable search and seizure; guarantees of procedural laws such as 
due process of law; rights in a criminal prosecution such as the availability of defence 
counsel, a speedy trial; right of trial by jury; and guarantees against excessive and cruel 
punishment. 
M Kirby "The Role of the Judge in Advancing Human Rights by Reference to 
International Human Rights Norms" (1988) 62 AU 514,516. 
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B Canada 
The Canadian enacted the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, which is 
supreme law, in that judges can strike down legislation inconsistent with the rights 
contained in the Charter. 116 Many of the concepts, like those of the European 
Convention and of other Commonwealth Constitutions, share their origin in the 
American Bill of Rights. The result is that the judiciary adjudicate upon and uphold 
fundamental rights. The only exception is section 33 which explicitly confers on 
Parliament and the provincial legislatures the power to enact laws notwithstanding 
certain provision of the Charter. Three requirements must be satisfied to ensure that 
the legislative decision to enact an override clause is taken with full knowledge of 
the facts, thereby encouraging public discussion of the issues. Such a clause can 
only remain for a maximum of five years, but it can be re-enacted. This power has 
been used sparingly by the legislature. 11 7 
C Britain 
The concept of parliamentary sovereignty 1s much stronger in Britain, in 
comparison with countries that have an entrenched constitution and/or an enshrined 
Bill of Rights, because Britain has neither. 1 18 There are no "fundamental rights" in 
the strict sense, as legislative supremacy means there are no legal limits on 
Parliament. 11 9 Lord Reid summarised the position quite clearly: 120 
116 
117 
118 
119 
These rights include: fundamental freedoms (eg) of religion, expression and association; 
democratic rights (eg) right to vote; mobility rights (eg) to reside in any province; legal 
rights (eg) search and seizure; criminal proceedings; treatment or punishment; equality 
rights; minority language educational right ; rights of the aboriginal people (eg) 
affirmation of existing and aboriginal treaty rights. 
See L Zine Constitutional Change in the Commonwealth (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1991) 71. The reason section 33 was adopted was because most of the 
provinces would not have agreed to the Charter without it. 
It is intere ting to note that the most famous declarations of individual rights are 
ultimately traceable to inspiration drawn from English constitutional sources, such as: 
The Magna Carta ( 1215); Declaration of Bill of Rights ( 1689); Petition of Right ( I 928) 
and from legal and philosophical treati e on fundamental law and so called natural law. 
0 Hood Phillips Co11stitutio11al and Administrative Law (7ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London , 1987) 39 . 
l20 Pickin v British Railways Board [1974] AC 765,782. 
In earli.:!r times many learned lawyers seem to have believed that an Act of Parliament could 
be disregarded in so far as it was contrary to the law of God or the law of nature or natural 
justice, but since the supremacy of Parliament was finally demonstrated by the Revolution 
of 1688 any such idea has become obsolete. 
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This proposition is questioned by Mann who asks whether a statute depriving Jews 
of their British nationality, or prohibiting marriages between Christians and non-
Christians, or dissolving marriages between blacks and whites, would really be 
upheld. He makes reference to a case where four Law Lords held that a similar 
German statute hould be condemned as "so grave an infringement of human rights 
that the courts of this country ought to refuse to recognise it as a law at all." 121 
Although Britain does not have a written Bill of Rights as such, 122 they are obliged 
to follow their international commitments that guarantee human rights and 
fundamental laws. There is a strong movement both inside and outside the 
Commonwealth to define these. The jurisprudence and case law on the European 
Convention on Human Rights is used in developing the law, even though it is not 
incorporated domestically. 123 However, this is only an aid to interpreting 
ambiguities. 
The United Kingdom is also a party to the European Communities Act 1972, and in 
R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd 124 it was held that 
any Act passed by Parliament since the European Communitie Act, must be read 
as subject to directly enforceable rights arising under community law. This means 
a United Kingdom court can suspend the application of an Act if it is incompatible 
121 
122 
123 
124 
Oppenheimer v Cattermole [ 1976] AC 249, 278. 
There is some support for a Bill of Rights and written constitution. For example, a Bill 
of Rights has been passed by the House of Lords twice, but rejected by the House of 
Commons. 
J Laws "Is the High Court the Guardian of Fundamental Constitutional Rights" [ 19931 
PL 59, 61-62. 
[ 1991 J 3 All ER 769. The ea e involved the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 which was 
enacted in order to stop "quota hopping" whereby the United Kingdom's fi hing quotas 
were being plundered by fishing vessels nying the British nag but lacking any genuine 
connection with the United Kingdom. The legislation enacted strict rules governing 
British fishing vessels which barred 95 such vessels which were Spanish controlled. It 
was argued that it was unlawful discrimination on the grounds of nationality, contrary to 
European Community Law. 
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with European Community law. 125 This case appears to have laid rest to any 
lingering doubts regarding the acceptance by the British courts, of the supremacy of 
community law. 
A more recent decision 126 has reaffirmed this by holding that a statute passed by 
Parliament regarding employment was invalid as it was indirect discrimination 
against women, which was in violation with European Community law. A 
comment on the case stated: 127 
Suprising though the result may appear to those not yet aware of the extent of the change 
which community law has brought to our legal system, in the light of the Factortame 
decisions ... the outcome here was not really in doubt. United Kingdom courts can use 
judicial proceedings to strike down Acts of Parliament on the grounds of incompatibility. 
Although the courts have not yet decided whether Parliament can expressly override 
community law, it is argued that the price to pay for such action would be to end 
the United Kingdom's membership in the European Economic Community. 128 
The Factortame decision has significance in New Zealand 129 for what it said about 
the nature of the law-making powers of the United Kingdom Parliament, in that it is 
the courts that determine the nature of this power at any particular time. The 
principles determining law-making powers are not unalterable, as they are capable 
of changing from time to time. 130 However, there is relatively strong support in the 
United Kingdom for the benefits of European Economic Community membership, 
even at the cost of restraining the law-making competence of Parliament. 131 
125 
126 
127 
128 
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130 
131 
Editorial "Angling for Supremacy' [ 1990) NU 877. 
R v Secretary of State for Employment, ex pa rte Equal Opportunities Commission and 
Another Unreported, 8 March 1994, House of Lords. 
B Napier 'Victory for Part-time Workers" [ 19941 NU 396. 
B V Harris "Parliamentary Sovereignty and Interim Injunction : Factortame and New 
Zealand" (1992) 15 NZULR 55, 79. 
Above n 128, 64. 
Harris, above n 128, points out that this approach is similar to Sir Robin Cooke's 
doctrine. See below part VIII. 
Above n 128, 79. 
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Outsider~ see Britain, in practical terms, a having something in the nature of a Bill 
of Rights that is interpreted and applied by foreigners. 132 However, it is now 
beginning to be understood that a written constitution that is respected, provides 
valuable safeguards which in Britain are completely Jacking. This is the reason 
why there is some support for a BiJI of Rights, or a written constitution that would 
follow the standards set by the European Convention on Human Rights. 
D Australia 
Australia does not have a written BiJI of Rights, although it does have a written 
constitution, throughout which human rights are scattered. The legislative powers 
are diminished to the extent provided by the constitution. As no Bill of Rights is 
contained within the constitution, the judges do not have the power to strike down 
legislation contrary to human rights. However, there have been attempts to infer in 
the Constitution a fully fledged Bill of Rights, as implied rights. 133 Murphy J took 
this to the extreme as he did not relate these rights to any specific provision in the 
Constitution. Other judges have implied limitations based on the words "peace, 
welfare and good Government," 134 although the High Court has held that this does 
not confer a power to strike down legislation if it does not promote or secure the 
peace, order or good Government. I 35 
VI A CHANGING PERCEPTION OF THE LAW-MAKING 
POWERS OF PARLIAMENT IN NEW ZEALAND? 
Has New Zealand society become amenable to a change in the law making powers 
of Parliament, and a lessening of the hold of parliamentary sovereignty? Given the 
restrictions of the Bill of Rights, the other possibility for a restriction on the law 
making powers of Parliament is for the judiciary to claim a power at common law. 
Any change from the Diceyan model to a recognition of a common law limitation is 
132 
133 
134 
135 
Above n 117, 71. 
See discussion below part VII D. 
Parliaments of the Australian states are far more restricted in their legislative power than 
the New Zealand Parliament. 
Union Steamship Co of Australia Pty Ltd v King ( 1988) 82 ALR 43 . 
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possible as it is the courts who ultimately decide what "full power to make laws," 
as contained in section 15 Constitution Act 1986, actually means. 136 
A Factors Influencing a Change in Perception13 7 
It is argued that aspects of New Zealand's political and social history over the last 
twenty years have made the perception of the law-making powers of Parliament 
amenable to change. 
(a) New Zealand is no longer a homogenous society as it is rapidly becoming more 
diversified and pluralistic regarding issues of religion, culture, race and wealth. 
Consequently there exists a greater recognition of the need to protect the rights of 
minorities. As one Court of Appeal judge remarked in the l 980's: "It is a matter of 
everyday observation that New Zealand society has become more vocal, factional 
and discordant. There is a scepticism about established institutions." 138 There is a 
good argument that the protection of the democratic nature of our parliamentary 
institutions does not work for minority rights, as the "democratic nature" consists 
of the majority rule. It is argued that it is the courts who protect these groups who 
cannot gain access to the political process. I 39 
(b) A related factor is the rapidly growing recognition of Maori rights, where the 
Treaty of Waitangi has now achieved a prominent place in the New Zealand 
Constitution through express recognition of it's principles in statutes, 140 the 
Waitangi Tribunal decisions, and recognition of customary rights. 141 
(c) The Muldoon administration between 1975 and 1984 posed challenges to 
constitutional principles. Economic demands of the 1970's signalled the end of 
136 See B V Harris "A Changing Perception of the Law-making Powers of Parliament" 
( 1988) NZLJ 394. 
137 These factor have been drawn from Harris , above n 135, and PA Jo eph & GR Walker, 
above n 97. 
138 Donselaar v Donselaar [ 1982) I NZLR 97, I 06 per Cooke J. 
139 See W Sadurski "Last Among Equals: Minorities and Australian Judge Made Law" 
( 1989) 63 AU 474. 
140 
141 
For example the s 9 State Owned Enterprises Act l 986. 
Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer [ 1986) I NZLR 680. 
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consensus politics, 142 and government by regulation under the Economic 
Stabilisation Act 1948 became the norm. Calls for restraints upon the executive 
were heard from academics, lawyers, judges, the Ombudsman and some 
politicians. The courts in general proved unable to respond as their options were, 
in reality, limited by the doctrines of precedent and parliamentary sovereignty. 143 
What is more, they were limited by the absence of a constitution, Bill of Rights or 
common law precedent right to justify greater judicial intervention. 144 
This era involved a number of controversies such as: the unlawful suspension of 
the operation of a statute by the Prime Minister; 145 random street checks by 
Auckland police to enforce deportation orders under the Immigration Act 1964; 146 
the para-military police operation to evict land protesters from Bastion Point; the 
enactment of the Development (Clyde dam) Empowering Act 1982, overturning a 
court decision and granting a right to build a dam; the Citizenship (Western Samoa) 
Act 1982, which removed New Zealand citizenship from Samoans; and the 
Security Intelligence Service Amendment Act 1977 which created new powers for 
the interception of private communications. 
The Editor of the New Zealand Listener warned: l47 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
The present Government has been frequently c riticised for passing laws to restrict the 
individual freedoms of New Zealanders ... Public rage and Parliamentary disruption about 
disappearing freedoms are dramatic, largely ineffectual ... It's time to hold public meeting 
which will urgently explore ways of permanently preserving our pre ent liberties . 
NZ grappled with increased energy costs from OPEC; record inflation ; loss of primary 
sector export markets; high international debt servicing; and unemployment. 
For example in Fitzgerald v Muldoon [ 1976] 2 NZLR 615 the Chief Justice condemned 
extra-Parliamentary law making , but effectively allowed the government six months to 
pass the proposed superannuation legislation. In Ashby v Minister of Immigration 
[ I 98 I] I ZLR 222 the High Court rejected an application to overturn the Minister's 
decision to grant entry permits to the South African rugby team in 1981 . 
Although in Fitzgerald v Muldoon , above n 143, the courts resorted to the Bill of 
Rights 1688 . 
Fitzgerald v Muldoon above n 143. 
Nowhere under the Act is there authority for police to demand evidence of a person's 
identity of authority to enter or remain in New Zealand in the absence of good cause to 
suspect an offence against the Act. 
Editorial, "A Bill of Rights" New Zealand Listener, 25 ovember 1978. 
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What is to say that a future government would not enact similar legislation? 
Perhaps if it Parliament understood that breaches of human rights could be 
overruled by the judiciary, they would not be so quick to overrule court decisions 
to achieve the desired outcome. 
The dilemma for the courts did not disappear with the demise of the Muldoon 
Government. Under the new Labour Government, radical reforms ensured that 
administrative and economic power was increasingly passed to outside agencies, 
and the state became less accountable. The Leader of the Opposition, Jim Bolger 
claimed they had: "ridden roughshod over citizen's rights." 148 As the political 
system is inadequate for imposing sufficient restraint, the burden must surely fall 
on the courts. However, "the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty dictates a 
hands-off approach."149 
(d) There are other pieces of legislation, outside the Muldoon era, which can be 
cited a examples that would not have survived scrutiny if the judiciary had a power 
to review legislation. 150 These include several older pieces of legislation 151 and 
wartime legislation.152 In more recent times, the Waterfront Strike Emergency 
Regulations, made pursuant to the Public Safety Conservation Act 1932, prohibited 
freedom of speech concerning the strike. Although this Act is now repealed it 
provided an unfettered power to govern New Zealand by regulation. The 
Whangarei Refinery Expansion Project Disputes Act 1984, gave power to the 
police regarding an industrial dispute, that ran contrary to the guarantee of freedom 
of expression and assembly. It was an offence, punishable by imprisonment, to 
fail to comply with a police direction. Furthermore, section 17 Police Offences 
Amendment Act 1951 left it to the judgment of the Police Officer to determine the 
creation of criminal picketing. 
148 
149 
150 
151 
152 
Quoted in A McRobie "Electoral System Operations" in H Gold (ed), above n 25, 452 at 
458. 
J Kelsey Rolling Back the State: Privatisation of Power in Aotearoa/New Zealand 
(Bridget Williams Books, Wellington, 1993) 194. 
These are taken from Palmer above n 31, and K Keith "The Bill of Rights: Reply to a 
Criticism" [ 19851 ZLJ 270. 
Such a the Maori Prisoners Act 1880 and the Tohunga Suppres ion Act 1907. 
Although we must remember the period of time, a survey of emergency legislation 
showed that Parliament ha not been particularly effective in protecting individual 
liberties. See Palmer, above n 31, 67. 
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Although it is unlikely that Parliament will sweep away our rights, it is the small 
erosions we have to concern ourselves with. Examples of these are expressed by 
Professor Keith. They include the huge number of powers to enter and search 
premises. Although some may be justified, others are very broad and do not 
contain adequate safeguards. There are many reverse onus provisions on the 
books, most of which are justifiable as the relevant matter falls within the 
defendant's know ledge. However, section 299 of the Customs Act 1966 is of very 
wide scope. It is difficult to conjure up a reason justifying a reverse onus in a 
prosecution for assaulting a Customs Officer. 
(d) The courts have played a part in establishing an environment that allows for a 
change in perception. Firstly, they have developed a unique common law for New 
Zealand, which paves the way for recognising that the law-making powers of the 
New Zealand Parliament are different from the English Parliament. As Harris 
noted : "It will be much easier for the courts to interpret the law making powers of 
Parliament to be less than supreme and subject to some substantive limits." 153 
Secondly, the broad range of factors now considered in interpreting and applying 
legislation has contributed to this change. 154 
(e) There have been calls over the years by particular groups and individuals for 
formal restraints upon the law-making powers of Parliament. The Bill of Rights 
discussion and Sir Robin Cooke's doctrine can both be seen as a part of this. 
However, it is arguable whether this is a widespread concern throughout the 
community, as it seems there are a number of groups and individuals advocating 
that it would be sensible to have such restraints, rather than public opinion 
demanding it. I 55 
153 Above n 136,395 . 
154 Such as Hansard; ratified International Conventions; social and economic concerns; review 
of general legislative approach . See I Richardson "The Role of the Judges as Policy 
Makers" ( 1985) 15 VUWLR 46. 
155 The best example of this is the public reaction in relation to the Bill of Rights . 
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B Effects under the Mixed Member Proportional System of 
Government I 56 
The biggest problem with parliamentary sovereignty is a powerful executive that 
dominates Parliament. As a former Member of Parliament stated: l57 
In the final analysis, it seems that a political system has evolved in New Zealand which is 
termed 'Parliamentary democracy' but which involves control of its vital functions by an 
increasingly powerful executive ... Legislative pressure at all levels can be used by the 
executive and the bureaucracy to stifle effective opposition from within or outside 
Parliament. 
The question is how this will change under MMP, the system of electoral law that 
was voted in a referendum in 1993 and will commence in 1996. I 58 Will this new 
system act as a check on Parliament so that additional checks by the judiciary are 
not needed? 
Presently, the overlap of membership between executive and Parliament, combined 
with the lack of other constitutional checks results in: "a dangerously centralised 
concentration of power in the cabinet." 159 This consequently permits Cabinet to 
push through almost any law .160 In other words, too much can be changed too 
quickly, with limited public input. According to Chen: "MMP will redistribute 
power away from Cabinet towards Parliament, minor parties and the public ... This 
will strengthen checks on Cabinet and may bring its 'elective dictatorship' to an 
end." 161 There will be an increased likelihood of coalition governments or minority 
156 
157 
158 
!59 
160 
161 
Hereinafter referred to as "MMP". 
See above n 97, 164. 
In the 1993 election a very high percentage of voters voted for minor parties and in the 
accompanying electoral referendum, a majority (54%) voted in favour of MMP and the 
ending of two-party dominance. See R Mulgan Politics in NZ (Auckland University 
Press, Auckland, 1994) 261. 
P J Downey "Constitutional Arrangement " [ 1990] ZLJ 341 . 
Above n 92, 23 . Our system means that legislative approval may come from a narrow 
majority within one minority segment of one party, which has only minority support in 
the country. See A McRobie "Electoral System Operations" in H Gold (ed), above n 25, 
452 al 458. 
Above n 92, 23. 
38 
governments and this will, in turn, result in Cabinet having to consult and negotiate 
with minor parties whose support will be needed to pass legislation. 
The increase in numbers of Members of Parliament will be more representative of 
the nation as a whole, as shown by the experience in other countries, as the parties 
try to achieve an overall balance of candidates, appealing to a range of voters. This 
will hopefully mean different viewpoints will be heard within Parliament in shaping 
policies and legislation. 162 Although, in New Zealand, the pool of people able and 
willing to become Members of Parliament will remain quite small. 163 One benefit 
will be the increase in numbers to staff select committees that scrutinise legislation, 
and the likely chance that committees will not have a government majority. 
Recommendations and criticism will be taken more seriously, because to ignore 
them will give "political ammunition" to the opponents that may be used in breaking 
down the government's majority. 164 
Furthermore, under the First Past the Post system, the public's ability to vote out 
the government (the ultimate sanction) may only put the other major party into 
power. Whereas under MMP the public will, can be translated more clearly, and 
minor parties will have a greater chance to win seats. 
On the other hand, Sir Geoffery Palmer has argued that MMP will not change our 
system of Government as radically as people expect. 165 Although Cabinet's grip 
on the legislative process will weaken, and the accountability of the executive will 
increase, he believes Cabinet will survive and National and Labour are still likely to 
be the major actors. l66 
There will be many aspects of the system that will not be affected by MMP and 
proportional representation. For example we will still have a "Westminister" 
162 
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P Harris & E McLeay "The Legislature" in G R Hawke (ed) Changing Politics ? The 
Electoral Referendum (Institute of Political Studies, Wellington , 1993) I 03 
G R Hawke "Direct or Indirect Decision : MP's True and Effective Police" in G R 
Hawke, above n 162, 145 at 163. 
Above n 161 , 127. 
"MMP and the Changing Face of Public Accountability" The Independent , Wellington, 
New Zealand, 22 April 1994, 14. 
Palmer believes that abolishing the monarchy would bring far more "profound and radical 
constitutional changes" and will probably involve a written constitution being established 
which will give the judiciary political power to strike down legislation . See above n 165. 
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system, with no simple mechanism for controlling members of Parliament. The 
government may be less accountable, as coalitions will involve bargaining over 
policy options after the election, and therefore there will be uncertainty as to the 
politics that will be followed. 167 Other constitutional changes are needed, as 
electoral reform is only one aspect of our constitutional arrangement . As Capill 
argues: "electoral reform is one way accountability can be put back into our legal 
system." 168 
The problem in relying on MMP as a substantial safeguard is the ignorance of the 
public. Recent surveys show there is an alarming Jack of awareness about how 
MMP works. The result is that "voters could choose a government entirely 
different from their real wishes." 169 For example 70 per cent of the population are 
unaware that it is the party vote alone that determines the overall parliamentary 
representation under MMP.170 
What the actual effects of MMP will be involves speculation. If executive power is 
curtailed, then this is a strong argument against giving the judiciary a power to 
protect our right . However, if in reality MMP does not curtail executive power 
and act as a constitutional check, this is an argument in favour of a judicial power. 
The greater degree of consultation which coalition governments will generate is 
positive, however a government supported by a majority may still exercise 
considerable power. 17 I 
C Conclusion 
Joseph and Walker argue that: I 72 
I 67 A McRobie "The Electoral Referendum: Is ues and Option " in A McRobie (ed) Taking 
it to the People? The New Zealand Electoral Referendum Debate (Hazard Press, 
Christchurch, 1993) 24, 36. 
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G Capill "A Check on MP's Power" in McRobie (ed), above n 167, 140. 
See "Kiwi' Still in Dark Over MMP" The Dominion , Wellington, New Zealand, 14 
September 1994, I. 
See "Voters Still Don't Understand MMP" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 14 
September I 992, 12. 
See Mulgan, above n 158, 194. 
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New Z.!aland's legislative authority was acquired ... progressively , without incident, from 
a superior authority. Thus, once New Zealand acceded to legal independence from Britain, 
was there any necessity to assume the shackles of English sovereignty theory - of 
immutable, illimitable and perpetual powers of law-making? After all , legislative 
authority is an abstraction , capable of redefinition and therefore circumscription . 
The factors discussed above show that New Zealand is amenable to change, 
although this has to be judged considering the changes that will come from MMP. 
We are an independent country which means we can break from the shackles of 
sovereignty, if this is what is wanted and needed. It is argued that a "mature 
Parliament would not insist upon the continued assertion of its fantastical absolute 
powers at the expense of individual justice." 173 
VII SHOULD THE JUDICIARY BE THE GUARDIAN OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS? 
New Zealand is in an era of human rights both nationally and internationally, and in 
the national context there has been considerable movement in the human rights 
field. As well as the enactment of the Bill of Rights Act in 1990, recently we have 
enacted the Human Rights Act 1993, of which the long title states: 
An Act to consolidate and amend the Race Relations Act 1971 and the Human Rights 
Commission Act 1977 and to provide better protection of human rights in New Zealand in 
general accordance with United Nations Convenants or Convention on Human Rights . 
The calls for these documents show that: "the New Zealand Parliament is no longer 
seen as the sure and constant guardian of the citizen's rights." 174 If we accept that 
parliamentary sovereignty is not as absolute as it once wa , the most obvious 
choice for a check on Parliament is the judiciary. Do we want the judiciary to 
become the guardian of our human rights? 
A Arguments Against 
(a) Judges are unelected and giving them this power will have political 
implications, and may result in appointments to the judiciary becoming political. 
173 A Lester"Fundamental Rights : The United Kingdom Isolated" [1984] PL46, 71. 
174 J Caldwell "Judicial Sovereignty - A ew View" (1984] ZLJ 356, 358. 
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This would defeat the purpose of the judiciary being the guardians as it would be 
essential that they remain independent. However, given New Zealand's history, it 
seems unlikely this will happen. In response to this argument, Lord Hailsham's 
response is: 175 
They are under the curious illusion that the Judges are not already in Politics .. If they [the 
judges] a sume jurisdiction they are in politics ; if they decline jurisdiction they are in 
politics. All they can hope is to be impartial. 
Judges are already immersed in policy and politics. To keep out of politics, the 
judiciary would be confined to only adopting literal interpretations of Acts. 176 
(b) There will be considerable uncertainty in the law, if the judges are given the 
ability to review legislation. This argument is weak as it would be likely that 
judges would only use this power very sparingly. The situation can be compared 
with Canada, where the judges only strike down legislation when it is absolutely 
necessary. The existence of such a power is more likely to encourage Parliament to 
enact legislation that will not be critici ed by the judiciary, as having their 
legislation struck down periodically for failing to comply with human rights, will 
certainly entail political costs. 
(c) The sanction rests with public opinion, not with the courts. The ultimate 
sanction for Parliament overriding fundamental human rights is for the public to 
vote them out. 177 This will always remain a check with our three year term of 
Parliament which allows the public to express their opinion. However, this 
sanction only occurs after the breaches have occurred and realistically given the 
political situation in New Zealand, the other parties that can be voted in may not be 
a favourable alternative. 178 The constitutional convention should be safe in the care 
of public opinion and the ballot box, but realistically this control is too broad by 
itself to ensure that individuals and minorities receive justice. 179 
175 
176 
177 
178 
179 
See above n 98 , 97. 
Above n 98, 97. 
See above part II B3 . 
Especially given the dominance of the National and Labour parties in New Zealand . 
However, this may change under MMP. 
RA Quentin-Baxter "Theme of Constitutional Development: The Need for a Favourable 
Climate of Discussion" ( 1985) 15 VUWLR 12, 22. 
42 
(d) Judges are not necessarily reflective of society in their views and attitudes. 
They are not representative of society in the same sense as politicians, and generally 
judges come from similar social and economic groups. This point was discussed 
by Sir Ivor Richardson 180 who conceded that the judiciary was not physically 
representative of the race, gender, age or socio-economic composition of society. 
Nevertheless he stated 181 
Those of use who sit as appellate judges are well aware of the importance of trying to keep 
abreast of changing pressures within our ociety so as to be able to reflect current 
community aspirations in the value judgments we are called on to make. 
His Honour recognised the importance of continual legal education and the goal of 
striving towards the appointment of more women, minority group members and 
younger people to the bench. 
(e) We are giving too much power to executive-appointed judges, who are not 
directly accountable to the public, as they do not have to put their acceptability to 
the test of re-election. 182 Courts are assuming power to override the apparent 
wishes of the current elected majority in Parliament, and the result is the court 
usurping Parliament in manifesting the will of the people. 183 Furthermore, the 
judiciary do not have to justify their decisions in a public debate. This can be 
viewed as a positive argument, in that the judiciary do not need to make decisions 
based on a fear of not pleasing the majority of people. 
In Canada one lawyer has argued that giving judges wide Charter powers is a bad 
idea, as the judges became activists. They can strike down Jaws they do not like 
and accordingly they have been "using this power to tear away crucial elements of 
our social fabric." 184 The problem is a wider one concerning the process of 
appointment to the judiciary, as it i the personality of the judges that will determine 
what will be done with this power. 
180 
181 
182 
183 
184 
"Judges as Lawmakers in the 1990s" ( I 986) I l MLR 35. 
Above n 180, 41. 
lLM Richardson 'The Role of Judges as Policy Makers" ( 1985) 15 VU WLR 46, 50. 
Above n 128, 65. 
R Martin "A Bad Idea to Give Judges Wide Charter Powers" ( 1987) NZLJ 136. 
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B Arguments For 
(a) Most laypersons already regard the judiciary as the ultimate protector of their 
rights. 185 The question is whether the people would be satisfied with taking this 
power further and allowing the courts to adjudicate on whether an Act of Parliament 
should not be recognised because it infringes a fundamental right. This is a 
debateable point given the reaction to an entrenched Bill of Rights in New Zealand. 
However, it is obvious that judges today are activists and are showing considerable 
ability and maturity in areas such as judicial review, that gives us confidence in 
their ability to act as protector of our rights. Arguably, parliamentary politics is 
more concerned primarily with expediency, while the legal system (and the 
judiciary) is concerned with justice. 186 
(b) Our system is one of checks and balances, and no institution should have 
absolute power. As Sir Robin Cooke states: J 87 
Whether guaranteed rights are really fundamental - able to be overridden only by a special 
Parliament majority or a referendum - does not depend on legal logic. It depends on a value 
judgment by the Courts, based on their view of the will of the people. 
His Honour believes that the court should have responsibility for determining and 
giving effect to the "social contract." As Harris points out the underlying question 
is: I 88 
Whether the people of New Zealand have consented to Parliament having unlimited law-
making powers, or rather have they intended that the law-making power vested in 
Parliament should be constrained by the Courts' isolation and enforcement of fundamental 
common law rights? 
The problem is that there has never been a direct opportunity for the people of New 
Zealand to express their con ent or lack of it, as to the form of the legislative 
I 85 Above n 174, 359. According to Caldwell this means they would be expected to applaud 
Sir Robin Cooke's remarks regarding fundamentals, discussed below, part VIII A. 
186 J Hodder "Judges: Their Political Role" in Gold (ed), above n 25,410 at 420. 
187 R Cooke "Bill of Rights: Safeguard Against Unbridle Power" ( 1984) 112 Council Brief 
4. 
188 Above n 136, 396. 
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powers of Parliament. Sir Robin Cooke assumes the court can determine the will 
of the people, and this requires substantive constraints on Parliament. Arguably, 
this is only based on hypothetical consent as distinct from actual consent. 189 It is 
this reason why critics have been attracted, as they are not content with: 
"hypothetical consent overriding the expressed legislative will of the democratically 
elected Parliament."190 
(c) Our ratification of a large number of international human rights conventions 
shows our commitment to such ideals. We have dispersed with an Upper House 
and we are without the umbrella of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
its accompanying machinery, that means English law will respect such standards of 
a Bill of Rights, even though their law does not itself incorporate these 
standards. 191 
(d) In a democracy the judges are a bulwark between individual rights and the 
power of the executive, 192 whether we like it or not. If we do not allow the 
judiciary to become an effective check on the executive, who else is there to play 
the role? They are the only obvious constitutional check on power, and generally 
they are held in high social regard. To exempt Parliament from uch a legal check 
grants them dictational powers. Those opposed to giving the judiciary any extra 
powers, because they realise that judicial power can be abused, have to remember 
that ultimately the government can just re-enact legislation that the courts have 
struck down, and the ultimate sanction is removal of a judge from office. It is the 
fact of them having this power that is important, not so much the exercise of it, 
because this is what will act as a check on Parliament enacting such legislation in 
the first place. 
(e) There are greater dangers than the judiciary becoming "guardians of rights," 
such as the devious reasoning judges are driven to, to evade injustice. They can 
invent imaginary restrictions and read them into the legislation consistent with our 
rights, or they can ignore sections or put glosses on them. This involves the ame 
conflict between the judiciary and the legislature. 193 
189 
190 
191 
192 
193 
Because the people of New Zealand have not ex pre sly given their view. 
Above n 136, 397 . 
R Nicholson ''The Judiciary: The Guardian of the People" ( 1993) NZLJ 441. 
T Eichelbaum "Judicial Independence - Fact or Fiction" ( 1993) NZLJ 90. 
Above n 98 , 98 . 
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It is submitted that the judiciary are fit for the task of being the guardians of human 
rights. One only has to compare the Canadian situation, in that once their Charter 
was enacted the judiciary rose to the occasion. This was also reflective of the 
personalties on the judiciary, but these judges have now set a precedent for others 
to follow. 194 There is no reason why the same could not happen in New Zealand, 
albeit with a common law power. 
VIII FUNDAMENTALS 
During the Muldoon era a majority of the judiciary remained conservative, 
traditional and reluctant to interfere in "the proper conduct of Government." I 95 
Joseph and Walker 196 recognise that there are several reasons why judges defer to 
constitutional authority: the moral authority of the legislature (the democratic ideal); 
historical tradition (common law doctrine); or belief in the institutional superiority 
of legislature over courts (the integrity of the parliamentary law-making process). 
Sir Robin Cooke has seemingly endured doubts as to whether these reasons are 
good enough, the result being several dicta and an extra-judicial statement in 
support of a potential constitutional role for the common law. This was a direct 
attack on parliamentary sovereignty. 
A Sir Robin Cooke's Obiter Dicta 
Judicial invalidation of Acts of Parliament can be traced back to 1609, when Coke 
CJ observed that: I 97 
194 
195 
196 
197 
It appears in our books , that in many cases, the common law will controul Acts of 
Parliament and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament 
is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the 
common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void. 
Above n l 17, 65-67. 
Aboven 149,194. 
Above n 97, 171. 
Bonham 's Case ( 1609) 77 ER 646, 652. 
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There was some support from later cases, 198 and although it did recede into the 
background in England "strictly peaking it has never been overruled" .199 
Although not a New Zealand precedent, it i part of the common law of England, 
and section 5 Imperial Laws Application Act 1988, means it is part of New Zealand 
law. 
Sir Robin Cooke, in a series of obiter dicta, has revised this principle by surmising 
that ome rights go so deep as to be immune to Acts of Parliament. These dicta 
have been described by one commentator as: "amongst the most breath-taking dicta 
ever propounded by a New Zealand judge."200 
In L v M Cooke J (as he was then) stated:201 
It would be a strong and strange step for Parliament to attempt to confer on a body other 
than the Courts power to determine conclusively whether or not actions in the courts are 
barred. There is even room for doubt whether it is self-evident that Parliament could 
constitutionally do so. 
Then in Brader v Ministry of Transport: 202 
It may be added that the recognition by the common law of the supremacy of Parliament 
can hardly be regarded as given on the footing that Parliament would abdicate its function. 
It is not to be supposed that by the 1948 Act the New Zealand Parliament meant to 
abandon the entire field of the economy to the executive. 
l98 Such as Day v Savadge (1614) Hobart 86; 80 ER 235 and Lord Sheffield v Ratchliffe 
( 1615) Hobart 334, 336; 88 ER 1592, 1602. 
199 Above n 99, 280. 
200 
201 
202 
Above n 174, 357. 
( I 979] 2 NZLR 519, 527. This case involved an action against a gynaecologist for 
negligence in an unsuccessful operation to prevent further pregnancy . The i sue that 
raised this comment was whether the Accident Compensation Commission had exclusive 
jurisdiction extending beyond the question of cover. 
[ 1981 l I NZLR 73, 78. This comment was made in the contest of determining whether a 
regulation made under the Economic Stabilisation Act 1948, regarding carless days, was 
ultra vires . 
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Following on in 1982 in New Zealand Drivers Association v New Zealand Road 
Carriers a majority of the Court of Appeal stated that:203 
Indeed we have reservations as to the extent to which in New Zealand even an Act of 
Parliament can take away the rights of citizens to the ordinary Courts of law for the 
determination of their rights. 
In slightly stronger language, Cooke J in Fraser v State Services Commission 
stipulated that:204 
This is perhaps a reminder that it is arguable that some common law rights may go so deep 
that even Parliament cannot be accepted by the courts to have destroyed them. 
The position was made quite clear in Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board when 
His Honour stated:205 
I do not think that literal compulsion by torture for instance, would be within the lawful 
powers of Parliament. Some common law rights presumably lie so deep that even 
Parliament could not override them . 
Furthermore, in Keenan v Attorney-General Cooke P said:206 
203 
204 
[ 1982] I NZLR 374, 390. This ea e involved determining whether a regulation relating 
to a dispute of interest not being determined under the Arbitration court, through a wage 
free regulation, was ultra vires. 
[ 1984] I NZLR l 16, 121. This case concerned the appeal regarding a dismissal from the 
public Service, and whether the Commission should have used the procedures in s 58 
State Services Act 1962 to enable the officer to answer new allegation . This statement 
was made in the context of a di cu sion on natural justice, but Cooke J noted that the case 
could not concern a determination of whether there are some common law rights this 
important. 
205 [ I 984] I NZLR 394, 398. The issue wa of the scope of the privilege against self 
206 
incrimination in the context of determining whether the Poultry Board Act 1980 
authori 'ed the making of regulations which created an offence of refusing or failing to 
answer inquiries put to a person by an authorised officer of the Poultry Board. 
[ I 986] I NZLR 241, 244. This case involved the power of the police to insist on the 
giving of fingerprints by persons in custody. 
A duty to answer questions by a police or other officer is usually only imposed by express 
enactment and is never in this country enforceable by literal physical compul ion. This 
subject is discussed in Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board [ 1984] I NZLR 394, 398-
406. 
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A High Court judge adopted this analysis in Bradley v Attorney-General 207 in 
determining to whom natural justice applied. It was held that the: "clear implication 
from [Fraser] ... is that natural justice does now apply if it can be said that the 
decision will have no important adverse effect on the person seeking to have it 
reviewed." Smellie J seems to be supporting natural justice as a "common law 
right. "208 
In summary, Sir Robin Cooke has transformed a constitutional convention into a 
judicially enforceable rule of law, which takes us back to the times of Coke, albeit 
in obiter statements. If this approach is adopted, it would mean the court would be 
able to recognise the will of the people as providing cause for upholding an 
entrenched Bill of Rights. 209 The statements lend support to the theory that the 
court (at least certain judges) will not recognise an Act or provision that overrides 
fundamental common law rights. 
The scope of the dicta was not limited to fundamental moral principles. For 
example, although torture is morally repugnant, some may argue that statutes that 
purport to authorise dismissal without a hearing, or removal of citizen's rights to 
ordinary courts of law are not equal infringements of fundamental common law 
rights. The problem with the doctrine is in defining which rights are to be 
protected. 
B Extra Judicial Statement 
During the late 1980' s observations offered by Sir Robin Cooke in case law were 
supplemented by extra-judicial statements. These were often claimed to be purely 
207 
208 
[ 1988] 2 NZLR 454. 
Above n 207,467 per Smellie J. Here a former naval officer was applying for a review of 
the exercise of certain allegedly statutory powers of decision making resulting in him 
being downgraded. 
209 Above n 136, 65 . 
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personal, and: "not clothed with the authority of the judicial gown,"21 0 although on 
other occasions he spoke from his position as President of the Court of Appeal. 
One such occasion was his "Fundamentals" statement.211 
In the context of discussion of 'the fundamental question' he referred to a series of 
cases in determining the question: "What is the function of the courts in relation to 
Acts of Parliament?" His Honour concluded that: "it is the duty of the Courts, their 
constitutional role, to ascertain the democratic will of the people as expressed in 
Acts of Parliament."212 This statement is qualified by a submission that there are 
two: "complementary and lawfuJly unalterable principles: the operation of a 
democratic legislature and the operation of independent court . "21 3 His Honour 
accepted that Parliament has a constitutional role to lay down policy, and the courts 
must uphold and respect this. However, there are limits on legislative power. 
If Parliament attempts to significantly undermine either of these unalterable 
principles, then it is the responsibility of the judiciary to say so, and furthermore it 
is suggested that if the judgments are then disregarded, it would be the duty of the 
judge to resign. Alternatively they could publicly acknowledge that they wiJI depart 
from their judicial oath and serve a state that is now not entitled to be called a free 
democracy. 
Although the ultimate issue of whether an Act is ineffective was never raised, it is 
admitted that it was "not clear" that if Parliament had gone further the courts should 
have recognised it as valid. Several possible Acts of Parliament are cited which to 
Sir Robin Cooke illustrate "that the concept of a free democracy must carry with it 
some limitation."214 The conclusion is that: "one may have to accept that working 
2 I O R Cooke "Introduction" [ I 990) NZULR I, 2. 
2 I I Above n 4. Cooke P noted in another such statement "Fairness" ( I 989) I 9 VUWLR 421 
that such "extra-judicial disquisition had become almost a conventional obligation." He 
expressed some reservations about it, but decided that awareness of the dangers will help 
prevent them. 
212 Above n 4, 163 . 
213 Above n 4, 164. 
21 4 The examples are if an Act purporting to strip Jewish people of their citizenship and their 
property ; or to disenfranchise women; to require the courts, to receive in evidence any 
statement appearing to be a confession of a crime, whether or not obtained by 
compulsion . 
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out truly fundamental rights and duties 1s ultimately an inescapable judicial 
responsibility." 
C Analysis 
Sir Robin Cooke is submitting that there are legal (as well as political) limits to the 
"sovereignty of Parliament." There has been a substantial amount of criticism 
against this theory, even apart from the usual commentators. 2 I 5 Kirby P in 
Building Employees and Builders' Labourers Federation of New South Wales v 
Minister for Industrial Relations and Another 216 stated that thi appeal to natural 
law and to a principle higher than parliamentary sovereignty is not consistent with 
current constitutional theory in Australia.2 17 In support of this Kirby P recogni ed 
that:218 
Such extra-constitutional notions must be viewed with reservation not only because they 
lack the legitimacy that attaches to the enactments ultimately sanctioned by the people. 
But also because, once allowed, there is no logical limit to their ambit. They thereby 
undermine a rule of law and invite the only effective substitute viz the rule of power. 
Political realities and a loyalty for "elected democracy" led to a rejection of a notion 
of fundamental rights, that Parliament cannot destroy. Kirby P is quite content with 
the protection from the democratic nature of our parliamentary institutions, and the 
fact that parliamentary sovereignty is subject to the rule of law. His Honour further 
recognised the problem of defining what these common law right are. 
215 
216 
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Including G Winterton "Extra-Constitutional Notions in Australian Con titution Law" 
( 1986) 16 FLR and Dugdale in a review of Judicial Review of Administrative Action in 
the J 980 's: Problems and Prospects" [ 19871 NZLJ 124, 125. 
( 1986) 7 NSWLR 372. This ea e involved a challenge to the cancellation of the 
registration of an industrial union made pur uant to an Act. The union claimed it was 
entitled to a hearing, which was rejected. While an appeal was pending the Parliament 
passed an Act "to remove doubts" regarding the validating of the cancellation. This was 
challenged on the ground that it had a right to pursue its judicial proceeding with which 
Parliament could not interfere . 
Reference is made to Pickin v British Railways Board, see above n I 19; and Duport 
Steels Lrd v Sirs [ I 9801 I WLR 142, which rejected such a notion. 
Above n 2 I 6, 405. 
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Zines219 agrees that legislative restrictions not based on a specific provision are 
highly dangerous and uncertain. In the drafting of constitutional provisions and 
Acts there is room for consideration of the issues, and guidelines can be provided 
for. An open-ended power is inviting judges to determine matter based on their 
own political philosophies. She poses the question: "who can override the 
judges?" This reasoning is arguably more appropriate for the Australian 
Constitution which has a bicameral legislature, and affords greater protection 
compared to New Zealand's unicameral legislature. 
It is argued that Sir Robin Cooke: "i advocating revolution by mounting an open 
challenge to the doctrine of absolute parliamentary sovereignty."220 It is seen as a 
concern that the President of the Court of Appeal (which for most New Zealand 
litigants is realistically their court of last resort) is expressing such constitutional 
views that are subversive of parliamentary sovereignty, which is argued to be a 
doctrine that the judicial office must uphold. The judgments do not provide any 
analysis or reasoning in relation to the conclusions. Furthermore, it is argued that it 
would be undemocratic to allow the judiciary to override parliamentary sovereignty. 
However, it is just as undemocratic to pass an oppressive Act. It is an accepted 
constitutional convention that Parliament should not use its omnipotent law-making 
powers in an 'oppressive way.'221 
A further criticism is that these "judicial asides," will only lead to a re-examination 
of the ultimate legal principles.222 This may not be so much of a criticism if we 
view this re-examination as one of reconciling the checking y tern in that the 
courts and Parliament are seen as complementary, as one providing a check on the 
other, and any potential abuse of power is reduced. 
219 Above n 117. 
220 Professor Smillie in MB Taggart (edited) Judicial Review of Admi11istrative Action in the 
1980's: Problems and Prospects (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1986). 
221 Above n 136, 394. 
222 As Salmond stated: "there must be some self-existent rule(s) on which all the others hang 
... otherwise the investigation of the sources of law would lead to infinity." JW Salmond 
The First Principles of Jurisprude11ce (Stevens & Haynes, London, 1893) 220-222, 
discussed in A Frame "Fundamental Rights in the Realm of New Zealand: Theory and 
Practice" ( 1992) 22 VUWLR Monograph 4, 85 . 
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In defence of the doctrine, it is likely that judicial intervention would occur only 
when justice demands it. The ultimate sanction if the judges went too far, so as to 
lend truth to the statement "there is no logical limit to their ambit," is that Parliament 
has the power to remove the 'offending' judges for misbehaviour or incapacity to 
discharge their office.223 
In practise, restraint has been shown in exercising these asserted powers, and no 
New Zealand judge has contemplated invalidating a statute for such a reason as 
this. Arguably, this is reflective of reality as Parliament has never overstepped the 
mark to such an extent as to require the implementation of such measures. 
Although one only has to look at some of the measures discu sed above to refute 
this statement. As Caldwell postulates:224 
It may well be that some later generations of New Zealanders living under the yoke of an 
e lected tyranny will be gratefu l that a Court of Appeal Judge who lived in a time of peace 
and relative freedom had the strength of character to provide the basis for nullifying an Act 
of Parliament. 
One must question the "sanctity of statues" given that a good amount of judicial 
legislation occurs under the name of "interpretation."225 
D Implied Constitutional Rights in Australia 
Support for Sir Robin Cooke's common law rights is found in Australia where 
there has been an alleged "new" tendency of the courts to enhance the protection of 
fundamental freedoms and rights by constitutional implication . Although Australia 
does have a written constitution, and therefore differs from New Zealand, it is 
significant that the Commonwealth Constitution does not contain a Bill of Rights. 
223 
224 
225 
Section 23 Constitution Act l 986. 
Above n 174, 358 . 
As discussed above part II. 
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Murphy J has extrapolated from the Australian Constitution an implied Bill of 
Rights .226 On two occasions His Honour has invoked these rights for invalidating 
legislation.227 In McGraw-Hinds (Australia) Pty Ltd v Smith he stated: "some 
implications arise from consideration of the text; others arise from the nature of the 
society which operates the constitution."22 8 These cases were largely 
uncontroversial as it was regarded that the relevant implied constitutional guarantee 
(freedom of interstate communication) was embodied in an express constitutional 
provision. 229 
Winterton submits that the implied Bill of Rights is more likely to be: "based upon 
the unstated premise that certain fundamental rights and freedoms are part of the 
common law."230 This "doctrine" according to Winterton is problematic, as the 
judges are assuming the role of the legislature. Given the reaction in Australia to a 
statutory Bill of Rights, an open-ended constitutional Bill of Rights is likely to be 
considered undemocratic. Moreover, such a doctrine can only be determined by the 
subjective opinion of the judges a to the content of these rights. Winterton poses 
the question: "would we not have a Murphy Bill of Rights, a Barwick Bill of 
Rights, ... and so on ?"23 1 The conclusion is that this implied Bill of Rights is not 
constitutional, in that it lacks an adequate constitutional foundation. It is in fact 
extra-constitutional. 
In BLF v Minister for Industrial Relations 232 a majority of the judges also rejected 
a fundamental common law principle capable of overriding Parliament. Although, 
Street CJ thought that the New South Wales Parliament may be bound by such a 
notion through section 5 Constitution Act 1902 (NSW) which affirms "peace, 
226 
227 
228 
These rights have included the freedom of speech, assembly, communication and travel 
through the commonwealth; freedom from slavery, serfdom, cruel and unusual 
punishment, and arbitrary di scrimination on the ground of ex; and freedom for fully 
competent adults from subjection to guardianship. See Winterton, above n 215, 228 (n 
42). 
McGraw-Hinds (Australia) Pty Ltd v Smith (1979) 144 CLR 633; Miller v TCN 
Channel Nine Pty Lrd ( 1986) 67 ALR 321 . 
Above n 227, 668. 
229 Section 92 which concerns the freedom of trade within the Commonwealth. 
230 Above n 2 I 5, 229. 
231 Above n 215, 234. 
232 Above n 216. 
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welfare and good Government."233 In Union Steamship Company of Australia Pty 
Ltd v King 234 it was held that this does not confer power to strike down 
legislation if it does not promote or secure the peace, order or good government. 
However, they left open the question of the common law rights doctrine. 
In two recent cases the courts have protected fundamental rights through 
"constitutional implications." In Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth of Australia (No 2)235 four judges relied on a constitutional 
implication guaranteeing the freedom of political expression, to determine the case. 
Mason CJ stated:236 
In deciding an issue of proportionality in the context of the incidental scope of a substantive 
legislative power the court must take account of and scrutinise with great anxiety the 
adverse impact, if any, of the impugned law on such a fundamental freedom as freedom of 
expression. 
In Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills, 237 a case delivered on the same day, a 
majority held that the law regulating political broadcasting was invalid. All except 
Dawson J used a constitutional implication of freedom of communication. The 
constitution was viewed as bringing into existence a system of representative 
government, and freedom of communication is essential to the efficacy of this. 
Several days after these judgments Toohey J, gave a paper, and essentially 
233 
234 
235 
236 
237 
Murphy J had drawn a similar conclusion from this phase in ss 51 and 52 Commonwealth 
Constitution in Sillery v R ( 1981) 35 ALR 227, 234. Two of the other judges took a 
contrary view, Kirby P (p 406) and Mahoney JA (p 413), and Glass JA left the question 
open (p 407). 
(1988) 166 CLR 1. 
( 1992) I 08 ALR 577. This case concerned the validity of a s 299 of the Industrial 
Relations Act 1988, which purported to forbid use of written or oral word calculated to 
bring into disrepute the Industrial Relations Commissioner or any member of the 
Commission. 
Above n 235, 693. 
( 1992) I 08 ALR 681. The issue concerned with was whether Part IIID of the 
Broadcasting Act 1942, should be invalidated. It was designed to establish a regulatory 
regime for the broadcasting of political advertisements. The prohibition applied to the 
publishing of advertisements of "a political matter" and publishing matter on behalf of a 
government during an election period. "Freetime" could be allocated in accordance with 
regulations in relation to each election. 
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concluded that some principles are fundamental, and it is the role of the judiciary to 
give effect to these principles within the rule of law, even if there is no express 
embodiment of the liberty in question, to prevent a misuse of legislative power.238 
The controversy that followed these sugge tions of a "judicially created" Bill of 
Rights brought comment that perhaps judges should undergo judicial confirmation 
(as in the United States) before appointment.239 Lee argues that this move is not 
sudden in that recent decisions give evidence of growing activism with the judiciary 
in an attempt to elevate the importance of fundamental rights. 240 
In determining whether this doctrine contradicts parliamentary overeignty in 
Australia, it must be noted that a 1988 referendum for extending and strengthening 
the guarantees in the Constitution was defeated, although it was ubrnitted that the 
campaign for the referendum was surrounded by distortion and political 
grandstanding. 241 Furthermore, a recent survey shows a majority of Australians 
prefer the judiciary as opposed to Parliament as guardian of their basic rights.242 In 
applying this analysis to New Zealand, regard must be paid to the constitutional 
nature of Australia. Acceptance of fundamental human rights by implication in the 
constitution is one thing, and commands more constitutional authority than Sir 
Robin Cooke's suggestions in the New Zealand context. 
Lord Denning also supports Sir Robin Cooke.243 In discussing this issue he cited 
Lord Acton's expression, that: "Power tend to corrupt and absolute power 
corrupts absolutely," and posed the question "Is it not possible that Parliament may 
238 
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J Toohey "A Government of Laws, and not of Men?" in Conference Papers Constitutional 
Change in the 1990's, Darwin, 4-6 October, 1992. 
See H P Lee "The Austalian High Court and Implied Fundamental Guarantees" [ 19931 PL 
606, 616. 
See above n 239, 623. Some people are more concerned with the degree of power to 
imply into the Constitution, rather than the idea of judges reading implications into the 
constitution. 
241 See H P Lee "Reforming the Australian Constitution: the Frozen Continent Refuses to 
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Thaw" [ 1988] PL 535. 
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misuse it' ~ power?"244 He reminds us that the party who has gained the greatest 
seats can enact any legi lation it likes. Then he states:245 
The longer I am in the law - and the more statutes I have to interpret - the more I think the 
Judges [in England] ought to have a power of judicial review of legislation similar to that 
in the United States: whereby the judges can set aside statutes which are contrary to our 
unwritten constitution - in that they are repugnant to reason or to fundamentals . 
Borrowing from Professor Wade he cites some applicable examples: if Parliament 
was to legislate to establish one-part government, or a dictatorship, or attack any 
fundamental of democracy, and he adds, if Parliament abolished the two-chamber 
system. This, Lord Denning submits, is why we should have a system of checks 
and balances. 
IX CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the theory of "ab olute" parliamentary sovereignty, is flawed in 
the New Zealand constitutional setting. There are some existing safeguards that 
have been identified, such as: political fears; the moral effect of the Bill of Rights; 
scrutiny of legislation; and international commitments. However, none of these can 
stop Parliament enacting erosions of fundamental rights, if it chooses to do so. 
New Zealand lacks the proper constitutional checks to allow Parliament to have 
unlimited power to enact laws. It is time that these safeguards be reassessed, to 
protect fundamental human rights. 
This challenge against the legislature corresponds with the vastly increased checks 
that the judiciary of other countries have imposed upon Parliament. A Wade 
stated: "it i time that we took the trouble to discover how to provide ourselve with 
the legal mechanisms which virtually all other comparable countries have."246 
There is no perfect way of reconciling democratic theory with the protection of 
human rights. One may have to accept the possibility of tyranny by the majority, or 
power in an executive appointed judiciary to override the democratically elected 
244 Above n 243 , 723 . 
245 Above n 243 , 723 . 
246 Above n 98, 43. 
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Jegislature.247 It should not be a question of choosing one over another, rather both 
Parliament and the courts should act as checks on each other, thus upholding a 
separation of powers. 
Some may argue New Zealand needs a written constitution, or an entrenched Bill of 
Rights, which indicates in black and white the role of the judiciary, rather than an 
unspecified power. 248 However, the reality is that we do not have these. Is this 
any reason to leave Parliament with absolute sovereign powers, with reliance on 
checks such as the ballot box, and the morality and good faith of the politicians? 
It is not suggested that New Zealand has a bad record in relation to overriding 
human rights. It is the small erosions and the rights of minorities that need to be 
protected. Furthermore, the suggestion of limits on Parliament is in itself a means 
of protection. It acts as a detriment and encourages Parliament to scrutinise all 
legislation carefully, so as not to be put in a position of the judiciary having to 
review legislation, which can only have political costs. 
Without a written constitutional document, the only way the judiciary can have a 
power to review legislation, is as a common Jaw power, as suggested by Sir Robin 
Cooke. A study of parliamentary sovereignty shows that legislation impinging on 
our rights would not be valid, therefore the judiciary are justified in not upholding 
it. Sir Robin Cooke has laid the foundation for such a common law right, and it is 
submitted that in the present constitutional situation, it is just as valid for the 
judiciary to use this power, as it is invalid for Parliament to pass such legislation 
which requires this power to be u ed. The difficulty with the doctrine, is that i 
seems to be reserved for cases so extreme that they are unlikely to happen. 249 It is 
submitted that such a power should be used when Parliament enacts a provision 
which overrides a fundamental right, albeit only a small erosion. 
Some people may not agree with the judiciary having a power to judge the 
constitutionality of Acts. However, in reality they are achieving a similar result 
through interpreting provisions to accord with the value in society. In particular 
through interpreting provisions so they arc consistent with our present Bill of 
Rights. This is limited as interpretations can only be given to accord with values in 
247 Above n 136, 397. 
248 Above n 98, 99 . 
249 See P Rishworth "Civil Liberties" in H Gold (ed) above n 25, 143 at 149. 
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society, if they are realistic. Furthermore, Parliament can expressly override the 
rights if it so chooses. This is why a common Jaw power should be available in 
New Zealand. 
Instead of arguing this is "unconstitutional" or "undemocratic" it is argued the focus 
should be on improving the process of appointments to the judiciary. After all, 
whether a judiciary is willing and able to stand up and be the guardians of 
fundamental human rights, will depend on the personalties within the judiciary 
itself. 
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APPENDIX 1 - ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST AN 
ENTRENCHED BILL OF RIGHTS 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST 
1. Power is given to the judiciary who are unrepresentative of society, unelected 
and unaccountable, and consequently political appointments to the bench will 
result, and there will be a decline in public perception. 
2. The Bill of Rights is to be enforced through the judicial proces to which there 
is unequal acce s, especially for the poorer people who are most likely to have their 
rights infringed. 
3. Uncertainty would result because some Acts would be repugnant to the Bill of 
Rights and it could not easily be predicted what the laws would be. 
4. There would be an increased volume of litigation and the accompanying delays. 
5. An Upper House would be a better check and balance. 
6. It would be premature to adopt a Bill of Rights, as it is not necessary because 
there are no threats to human rights and, furthermore more time is needed in order 
to study the implications. 
7. The Bill of Rights would create a hierarchy of rights and it would emphasise 
individual not collective, rights. 
8. It would freeze constitutional development and would not allow for future social 
change. 
ARGUMENTS FOR 
1. New Zealand entertains a lack of constitutional safeguard (such as no written 
constitution, a smaller Parliament, no second chamber, and a small executive which 
has increasingly acted in important matters) and the Bill of Rights would be a check 
on the executive. 
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2. There would be protection for minority and disadvantaged groups, which 
democratic elections do not and cannot protect. 
3. There would be an educative effect, and awareness about human rights would 
be raised amongst New Zealanders. 
4. It would provide a bulwark against an erosion of rights. 
5. A Bill of Rights advances New Zealand's compliance with its international 
obligations to respect human right , especially the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. 
The Proponents Also Addressed The Arguments Against 
l. Although the Bill of Rights entails a transfer of power to the judiciary the judges 
already exercise control over Parliament. For example, in judicial review, and they 
are involved in decisions that have political implications. 
2. The argument that it is undemocratic ignores the fact that democracy needs to 
accommodate minority viewpoints, which a Bill of Rights will. Secondly the Bill 
of Rights will give New Zealander confidence and power to affect the actions of 
government. 
3. Political appointments are unlikely given the New Zealand tradition against this. 
4. As regards uncertainty, the Bill of Rights is more precise rn spelling out 
particular rights, and interpretative principles will be developed to allow 
predictability. 
5. Right may be adequately protected, but this overlooks that given a 
parliamentary majority, the government of the day is legislative omnipotent. 
6. As to freezing constitutional developments, overseas experience is that 
interpretation of such instruments has developed with the times. 
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